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Contents

Info Latin America <i>Bolivia</i> Adina Năstase & Ruxandra Laura Boşilcă	5
Papers	
<i>Two Priorities of Brazilian Foreign Policy: United Nations Security Council Reform and Responsibility While Protecting (RwP)</i> Lucian Băltăţescu	20
<i>The Pact for Mexico and its reforms – time for changes?</i> Adriana Soto Yánez	45
<i>EU and CELAC: strategic partners or asymmetrical interaction? Towards a balanced bi-regional relation</i> Bianca-Monica Mina	54
<i>Globalization of higher education: What does it mean for EU-LAC relations?</i> Raluca Georgiana Săftescu	64
<i>The cooperation relations towards development between Nicaragua and the European Union</i> Ana-Maria Geană	75

Contenido

Info América Latina	
<i>Bolivia</i> Adina Năstase & Ruxandra Laura Boșilcă	5
Ensayos	
<i>Dos prioridades en la política exterior de Brasil: la reforma del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y la Responsabilidad de Proteger (R2P)</i> Lucian Băltățescu	20
<i>El Pacto por México y sus reformas: tiempo de cambios?</i> Adriana Soto Yáñez	45
<i>La UE y la CELAC: ¿socios estratégicos o interacción asimétrica?</i> <i>Hacia una relación bi-regional equilibrada</i> Bianca-Monica Mina	54
<i>La globalización de la educación superior: ¿Qué significa para las relaciones UE-ALC?</i> Raluca Georgiana Săftescu	64
<i>Las relaciones de cooperación al desarrollo entre Nicaragua y la Unión Europea</i> Ana-Maria Geană	75

Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia

Adina Năstase
Laura Ruxandra Boșilcă

1. El sistema político

El Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia se rige según la Constitución¹ política vigente a partir del 7 de febrero de 2009, cuyas provisiones definen el país como un “estado unitario social de derecho plurinacional comunitario, libre, independiente, soberano, democrático, intercultural, descentralizado y con autonomías.” Bolivia se funde en la pluralidad y el pluralismo político, económico, jurídico, cultural y lingüístico, estos rasgos formando parte del proceso integrador del país.

El Estado está dividido en cuatro órganos del Estado: el ejecutivo, el legislativo, el judicial y el electoral,² mientras que el sistema político está compuesto por tres grupos: izquierda, centro y derecha, existiendo distintas tendencias dentro de estos grupos como radicales, extremistas, moderados, indigenistas, entre otros. Al igual que en muchos países de América Latina, el caudillismo, el populismo y la emergencia de movimientos sociales de obreros y campesinos han sido factores que dieron origen a las organizaciones políticas. El sistema político boliviano mantuvo la característica de conformación de coaliciones para alcanzar el control de los poderes legislativo y ejecutivo, mecanismo más conocido en Bolivia con el nombre de “democracia pactada”³, con un sistema de partidos moderado. La constitución más reciente del 2009 define un sistema de democracia presidencialista directa que se ejerce a través de tres siguientes formas: “*Bolivia, libre, independiente, soberana, multiétnica y pluricultural, constituida en República*

¹ Disponible para a <http://www.patrianueva.bo/constitucion/>

² Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, el 7 de febrero de 2009.

³ <http://www.fundase-bolivia.org/bolivia.html>

unitaria, adopta para su gobierno la forma democrática representativa, fundada en la unidad y la solidaridad de todos los bolivianos.”⁴

En este sentido, la Asamblea Constituyente, se instaura como un órgano representativo de toda la nación, extraordinario y temporal, investido de la tarea de generar un nuevo pacto social. Se constituye en una instancia de diálogo, deliberación y concertación con el objetivo de producir un nuevo diseño institucional, es decir una nueva Constitución Política del Estado. Por lo tanto, su eficacia depende de la capacidad de los actores estratégicos de lograr acuerdos y consensos en torno a objetivos y reglas compartidas y vinculantes. La Asamblea Constituyente es un proceso eminentemente político, en el que participarán representantes de la sociedad y de los partidos. El desafío para los distintos actores está en la apropiación de este acontecimiento a través de una participación proactiva, abierta y democrática.

2. La Constitución

La nueva Constitución aprobada el 25 de enero de 2009 garantiza los derechos de las comunidades indígenas tanto sobre sus tierras y recursos, como su participación en las estructuras políticas de Bolivia. De hecho, el gobierno de Evo Morales había propuesto un estado plural en reemplazo de un modelo capitalista o mixto, en el que el Estado únicamente vigilaba la economía, pero no participaba en ella. En el proyecto constitucional se establece un modelo económico plural, basado en la “economía comunitaria, estatal, privada y social cooperativa.”⁵ En cuanto a política exterior, el proyecto constitucional establece “el derecho irrenunciable e imprescriptible sobre el territorio que le de acceso al Océano Pacífico”. Además,, Bolivia se declara un país pacifista, que rechaza la guerra y prohíbe la instalación de bases militares extranjeras en su territorio.

El modelo de estado “plurinacional y autonómico” salido de la nueva constitución se fija dos objetivos en principio no necesariamente compatibles: el de la

⁴ <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/comp/estado/nombre.html>

⁵ http://www.bbc.co.uk/spanish/specials/1224_referendo_boliv/page6.shtml

“descolonización del estado y el de la descentralización política y administrativa del poder.”⁶

Cabe destacar que la Constitución de Bolivia de 2009 es la primera Constitución de las Américas que sienta bases para el acceso a derechos y poderes de todas y todos, adoptando “con resolución una posición íntegra y congruentemente anticolonialista, la primera que rompe de una forma decidida con el tracto típicamente americano del colonialismo constitucional o constitucionalismo colonial desde los tiempos de la Independencia.”⁷

3. El Presidente

Evo Morales llegó al poder en 2006, apoyado por la mayoría de la población de origen indígena, el programa político de su partido titulado “Movimiento al Socialismo” (MAS) siguiendo como meta principal “reemplazar el sistema neoliberal para transformar paulatinamente al socialismo.”⁸ Desde su perspectiva, los ejes de la “nueva Bolivia” serían la inclusión social de los indígenas y campesinos en las estructuras de poder y el liderazgo del Estado en la economía nacional. Como consecuencia directa, en los primeros años de su mandato se llevó adelante la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos que estaban en manos de los empresarios y la distribución de la tierra para beneficiar a los campesinos. Asimismo, Evo Morales promovió una Asamblea Constituyente que en diciembre de 2008 aprobó con un 61.4%⁹ de los votos un nuevo texto constitucional durante el referéndum popular.

El proyecto constitucional señalaba la necesidad de establecer un Nuevo pacto social entre todos los bolivianos por medio de la creación de un estado “plurinacional comunitario, descentralizado y autónomo, teniendo como base valores de la cultura indígena.”¹⁰ De esta forma, entre las características de la nueva Constitución destaca el otorgar más poderes al pueblo indígena – específicamente

⁶ http://www.newculturalfrontiers.org/wp-content/uploads/New_Cultural_Frontiers_7_Galvan.pdf

⁷ http://www.embajadadebolivia.com.ar/m_publicaciones/libros-pdf/04ncpe_cepd.pdf

⁸ <http://www.fusda.org/Revista15/Revista15-2.6BOLIVIA.pdf>

⁹ http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_7876000/7876136.stm

¹⁰ <http://www.patrianueva.bo/constitucion/>

la participación directa en los asuntos públicos y la toma de decisiones – reforzar el papel del estado en la economía y reconocer las autonomías en los niveles departamental, municipal e indígena.


4. El ejecutivo

La actual Constitución Política del Estado establece para Bolivia un régimen de gobierno presidencial, que se basa en la independencia y coordinación de los poderes del Estado y en la elección del Presidente de la República por voto directo y por un tiempo determinado de 5 años. Sin embargo, se introduce una variante con relación a otros regímenes presidenciales, pues si ninguno de los candidatos hubiese obtenido mayoría absoluta en la primera ronda de votación, la segunda vuelta electoral se realiza de manera indirecta, es decir en el Congreso, entre los dos candidatos más votados.

La democracia boliviana se encuentra asentada en un régimen presidencial muy particular, cuyas características han logrado mantener regularidad electoral y una relativa estabilidad política basada en acuerdos y coaliciones partidistas.

En la Constitución está previsto que el Poder Ejecutivo es ejercido en el ámbito nacional por el Presidente de la República conjuntamente con los Ministros de Estado. El Vicepresidente de la República es el encargado de ejercer la presidencia hasta la finalización del período constitucional, en caso de ausencia del presidente. Ambos son elegidos por sufragio directo y requieren para su nombramiento la mayoría absoluta de los votos. Si la nombrada no es obtenida, la elección pasa al Congreso Nacional. Sus mandatos “son improrrogables por más de cinco años (...) mientras que en el ámbito regional el poder ejecutivo a nivel departamental es administrado por un Prefecto, los cuales son nombrados por el Presidente de la República, previo proceso de elección por voto universal, directo por mayoría simple.”¹¹

¹¹<http://www.oas.org/electoralmissions/MisionesElectorales/Bolivia2008/FichaT%C3%A9cnica/SistemaPol%C3%ADtico/tabid/529/language/es-ES/Default.aspx>



(fuente: worldatlas.com)

5. El Legislativo

El Poder Legislativo reside en el Congreso Nacional, compuesto por la Cámara de Diputados y la de Senadores. Bolivia tiene la particularidad de que la Presidencia del Congreso Nacional es ocupada por el Vicepresidente de la República, en este sentido ejerce una dualidad de funciones, al pertenecer al Poder

Ejecutivo así como al Poder Legislativo. Dentro de las atribuciones de este rama del poder destaca la función legislativa y de control de los otros órganos del Estado.

Otro tema importante en la relación del Ejecutivo con el Legislativo es el referido al poder de veto del Presidente de la República. El objetivo de considerar la pertinencia o no de esta medida, se basa en la necesidad de preservar el colaboracionismo entre el Ejecutivo y el Legislativo, evitar conflicto de poderes y el obstruccionismo mutuo. La actual Constitución establece “que toda Ley sancionada por el Legislativo puede ser observada por el Presidente en el plazo de 10 días, de lo contrario será promulgada.”¹²

Las observaciones del Ejecutivo serán consideradas por el Congreso; si se encuentran fundadas, las modificarán y devolverán al Ejecutivo para su promulgación; de lo contrario, si las declaran infundadas por 2/3 de votos, el Presidente debe promulgar la Ley en el plazo de 10 días, si no lo hiciera, serán promulgadas por el Presidente del Congreso.

1. El judicial

El Poder Judicial es autónomo económica y administrativamente, y se ejerce por la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, el Tribunal Constitucional, las Cortes Superiores de Distrito, los tribunales y jueces de Instancia y demás tribunales y juzgados que establece la ley. Entre 1993-1994 fueron introducidos cambios sustanciales en la estructura y funciones del Poder Judicial con la creación de dos grandes instituciones: el Tribunal Constitucional y el Consejo de la Judicatura. En ese misma fecha “se reconoce el principio de unidad jurisdiccional, la independencia a los Magistrados y jueces en la administración de Justicia y se consagran los principios de gratuidad, publicidad, celeridad y probidad como condiciones esenciales de la administración de Justicia.”¹³

¹²<http://www.constituyentesoberana.org/info/files/Seminarios%20de%20Bolivia%20Poder%20Ejecutivo%20documento%20base.pdf>

¹³<http://www.oas.org/electoralmissions/MisionesElectorales/Bolivia2008/FichaT%C3%A9cnica/SistemaPol%C3%ADtico/tabid/529/language/es-ES/Default.aspx>

Con la posesión de 56 nuevas autoridades electas del Órgano Judicial y del Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, una nueva etapa había comenzado en la justicia boliviana en 2010. Empezó a funcionar la institucionalidad del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (o la Corte Suprema de Justicia), el tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, el Tribunal Agroambiental – o el Tribunal Agrario Nacional, el Consejo de Magistratura – o el Consejo de Judicatura y los tribunales departamentales de justicia (o las Cortes Superiores). La ley desde febrero de 2010 dispuso la designación de autoridades interinas en el Tribunal Constitucional, Consejo de Judicatura y Corte Suprema de Justicia por parte del Presidente del Estado y el acortamiento de mandato de los ministros de la Corte Suprema designados por el Congreso Nacional, en una etapa transitoria de reformas.

7. Las Organizaciones Internacionales de las que Bolivia forma parte

Bolivia se implicó activamente en los procesos de integración regional, como miembro de la Organización de Estados Americanos, de la Comunidad Andina de Naciones, de ALBA y de UNASUR y miembro asociado del MERCOSUR. Las relaciones cordiales con la UE se desarrollan bilateralmente en el marco de la cooperación regional entre la UE y la Comunidad Andina (CAN). Las relaciones se rigen por el Acuerdo Marco de Cooperación de 1993¹⁴, actualizado a nivel regional por el Acuerdo de Diálogo Político y Cooperación¹⁵.

Las prioridades de la UE en Bolivia son apoyar la el proceso político de democratización y contribuir al fomento de un desarrollo sostenible desde el punto de vista económico - la UE siendo el primer donante con respecto a la cooperación al desarrollo en Bolivia para crear oportunidades económicas a través de un trabajo digno; luchar contra la producción y el tráfico de drogas ilícitas; y conservar el medio ambiente.¹⁶

¹⁴ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/latin_america/r14008_es.htm

¹⁵ http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/colombia/documents/eu_colombia/pdca_1203_es.pdf

¹⁶ Para más información se puede consultar la página del Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior, http://eeas.europa.eu/bolivia/index_es.htm

Entre las principales Organizaciones Internacionales comerciales y económicas a las que Bolivia pertenece destacan¹⁷:

- Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC)
- Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI)
- Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN)
- Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) (como miembro asociado)
- Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF)
- Fondo Financiero para el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Plata (FONPLATA)
- Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA)
- Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL)
- Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA)
- Organización Latinoamericana de Energía (OLADE)
- Centro Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo (CLAD)
- Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Desarrollo (UNCTAD)
- Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID)
- Banco Mundial (BM)
- Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI)
- Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación (FAO)
- Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD)
- Organización de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Industrial (ONUDI)
- Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT)
- Grupo de los 77 (G77)
- Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual (OMPI)
- Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones (UIT)
- Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF)

¹⁷http://www.camara.com.bo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=127:pertenencia-a-organizaciones-comerciales&catid=47:bolivia&Itemid=74

8. Política exterior

Los principales objetivos estratégicos de Bolivia incumben la integración regional, el multilateralismo y la cooperación, la mediterraneidad, la defensa de cultivos originarios; y seguridad e integración energéticas.¹⁸ Por otro lado, la relación de Bolivia con su periferia inmediata es fundamental. En este campo, debe mantenerse el fortalecimiento de los vínculos nacionales con los países limítrofes, como también con los esquemas integracionistas de la Comunidad Andina y del Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR). Con respecto al campo de la integración, dado que Bolivia se encuentra en el centro del sudcontinente, su territorio es parte fundamental de los ejes interoceánicos programados por la Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Sudamericana (IIRSA).

Uno de estos proyectos el Eje Perú–Brasil-Bolivia, que cubre un área de influencia que vincula los nodos en la triple frontera de los países y representa un mercado de más de 10,2 millones de habitantes en un área de influencia extendida de 1,1 millones de km², con un valor agregado de aproximadamente US\$ 20.448,3 millones. Además, cuenta con 26 proyectos divididos en 3 grupos con una inversión estimada de US\$ 29.089.8 millones.¹⁹

Las prioridades de la política exterior de Bolivia, en los veinte años del proceso democrático, se adecuaron a las circunstancias prevalecientes. En la primera fase de reconstrucción democrática, la acción externa estuvo encaminada a conseguir los medios de apoyo externo, financiero y político, indispensables para vencer los problemas de la hiperinflación, la crisis del endeudamiento externo y el desplome de los precios del estaño y del gas, por un lado, y para consolidar el sistema democrático, por otro. La asistencia internacional fue un factor de importancia crítica en la superación de esta etapa. En la segunda, sin descuidar la anterior, la tarea estuvo dominada por las consideraciones relativas a la lucha contra el tráfico de drogas y el cultivo ilegal de hoja de coca. En realidad, la

¹⁸ Victoria Zapata, Evo Morales y la política exterior de los recursos, Cuaderno sobre Relaciones Internacionales, Regionalismo y Desarrollo, Vol. 6 No.12, Julio-Diciembre 2011, pp.113-114.

¹⁹ Datos de Octubre de 2013 disponibles a

<http://www.iirsa.org/Page/PageDetail?id=123&menuItemId=58>

comunidad internacional condicionó el acceso a financiamiento, mercados y cooperación financiera y humanitaria, a la erradicación de cocales y a la exclusión de Bolivia del circuito de la droga.

Cabe destacar que también el eje de las exportaciones bolivianas cambia de orientación. Durante casi toda la historia de la República, los países vecinos fueron lugares de paso de las ventas bolivianas de minerales y otros productos a los mercados de Estados Unidos o de ultramar. Sin embargo ahora, de manera creciente, se transforman en centros de consumo, en mercados sustantivos del comercio exterior del país, como ocurre con la soya o con el gas natural. La expansión de la frontera agrícola boliviana depende de su acceso a los mercados andinos, a los que debe agregarse Chile para la oferta exportable de agricultura tropical y ganadería del oriente. Por estas consideraciones, Bolivia tiene como principal meta en política exterior, la restauración de la soberanía marítima sobre la costa que perdió durante la Guerra del Pacífico en 1879, en la que tuvo a Perú como aliado, frente a Chile.

La Carta Constitucional de 2009 promulgada por el gobierno de Evo Morales establece, que Bolivia tiene “el derecho irrenunciable e imprescriptible sobre un territorio de acceso al océano Pacífico y a su espacio marítimo correspondiente”²⁰. También señala como objetivos irrenunciables la solución del conflicto por medios pacíficos y el ejercicio pleno de la soberanía sobre el territorio reclamado. La integración de América Latina surge también como prioridad en su política exterior, de carácter multilateralista y de cooperación.

Además, Bolivia ha sido parte constitutiva del proceso andino de integración que se inició en 1969, cuando participó en la suscripción del tratado de “la cuenca del Plata”, en el marco del proceso de institucionalización de las políticas de integración que buscan desde diferentes ámbitos, principalmente el comercial y el económico, la complementación y el desarrollo conjunto de determinadas regiones.

²⁰ Carta Constitucional de Bolivia, 2009

<http://www.uasb.edu.ec/padh/revista19/documentos/Constitucionbolivia.pdf>

9. Áreas prioritarias de la gobernanza

El comercio internacional es uno de los aspectos de mayor significancia, ya que tiene un papel determinante en el desarrollo y crecimiento económico de un país. Especialmente en aquellos de economías pequeñas y abiertas como la boliviana y que depende de exportaciones de muy pocos productos, pero que además cuenta con un reducido mercado interno. En los últimos años Bolivia ha registrado un notable aumento²¹ de las exportaciones liderado por los sectores de hidrocarburos y minería. Este auge ha permitido una mejora de las cifras de crecimiento y un fortalecimiento de la situación externa y fiscal. Entre los objetivos estratégicos institucionales caben destacar los siguientes²²:

- Reivindicar el derecho irrenunciable e imprescriptible de Bolivia al Territorio que le de acceso al Océano pacífico y a su espacio;
- Negociar acuerdos comerciales y de inversión; adecuar y fortalecer los procesos de integración, promoviendo los intereses nacionales bajo los principios de la Constitución Política del Estado ;
- Fortalecer la participación de Bolivia en los foros y organismos internacionales con el fin de promover temas clave de la política exterior así como los de la agenda internacional en coordinación con otros países;
- Fortalecer los mecanismos de gestión institucional, a través de acciones eficaces, eficientes y transparentes en cumplimiento de la normativa vigente;
- Institucionalizar en el aparato público del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, políticas, estrategias y prácticas de apoyo y protección a las bolivianas y bolivianos en el exterior, que garanticen el ejercicio de los derechos humanos fundamentales

Con respecto al campo de la educación, Bolivia lleva adelante desde 1994 el Programa de Reforma Educativa (PRE), en el que se establece el carácter democrático de la educación, por cuanto la sociedad participa en su planificación, organización, ejecución y evaluación. Asimismo, dispone la incorporación del

²¹ Informe del Fondo Monetario Internacional, abril 2014

<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1477.pdf>

²² <http://www.rree.gob.bo/webmre/principal.aspx?idpagina=55>

enfoque intercultural y la modalidad bilingüe en la educación, “respondiendo de esta forma a la heterogeneidad sociocultural del país.”²³ En la primera etapa de su ejecución (1995-2013), la Reforma Educativa priorizó su accionar en el nivel primario; sin embargo, la Estrategía de la Educación Boliviana 2004-2015, que se encuentra en proceso de consulta y concertación, plantea acciones que abarcan a todos los niveles y modalidades de educación del área formal y alternativa.

10. Símbolos nacionales

Uno de los símbolos importantes es la escaparela- símbolo que históricamente surge con la Revolución Francesa por la necesidad de llevar la bandera recogida en una cinta pequeña con los colores que identificaran a su identidad nacional. En Bolivia, este emblema simboliza los colores patrios, siendo portado como representación individual. El escudo de armas del país tiene la forma de una elipse, dentro de la cual aparece el cerro rico de Potosí alumbrado por un sol radiante, teniendo delante hacia la derecha, el árbol de pan y un haz de trigo; una llama completa este cuadro. El cóndor andino corona la parte superior de la elipse que además esta flanqueada en ambos lados por guarniciones de tres banderas, dos fusiles y un cañón a cada lado. La palabra "BOLIVIA" figura en la parte superior de la elipse y en la inferior hay diez estrellas que representan los nueve departamentos del país, siendo la décima la representante del litoral ocupado por Chile desde la guerra de 1879. Rodean al cóndor una rama de olivo y otra de laurel para representar la paz y la victoria.²⁴

La Bandera de la República de Bolivia consta de tres franjas horizontales de igual ancho y dimensiones, colocadas en este orden: una color rojo en la parte superior, una color amarillo en el centro y una color verde en la parte inferior.

²³ Informe OAS

<https://web.oas.org/childhood/ES/Lists/Recursos%20%20Planes%20Nacionales/Attachments/19/3.%20La%20educaci%C3%B3n%20en%20Bolivia,%20Indicadores,%20Cifras%20y%20Resultados.pdf>

²⁴ <http://www.mindef.gob.bo/mindef/node/165>

11. Las relaciones bilaterales Bolivia – Unión Europea

Las relaciones de amistad y cooperación entre Bolivia y la Unión Europea son amplias, transparentes y fructíferas. La presencia europea en Bolivia se expresa en la actividad que desarrollan la Delegación de la Unión Europea junto con las nueve embajadas de estados miembros de la Unión Europea, además de las agencias de cooperación, institutos culturales y organizaciones no gubernamentales. A través de las mismas, Europa se vincula con Bolivia en ámbitos que van desde las relaciones políticas bilaterales y regionales hasta las actividades culturales y deportivas, pasando por la cooperación financiera y asistencia técnica en diferentes áreas, además de los vínculos económicos y comerciales.

La Unión Europea enfoca su presencia en Bolivia en tres áreas principales²⁵:

1. **Solidaridad**, puesto de relieve en la lucha contra la pobreza - la Unión Europea es la principal fuente de recursos de donación para el desarrollo de Bolivia. El Grupo de Cooperación de la Unión Europea se reúne periódicamente para coordinar el trabajo de los donantes europeos en temas como seguridad alimentaria, fortalecimiento del Estado y democracia, agua potable, medio ambiente y educación.
2. **Valores democráticos y derechos humanos**, con un enfoque particular en la lucha contra la desigualdad, la discriminación y la violencia contra la mujer, sin dejar de lado temas importantes como la gobernabilidad y la libertad de expresión. El Grupo de Derechos Humanos de la Unión Europea trabaja con organizaciones bolivianas, el Gobierno de Bolivia y la comunidad internacional para garantizar que Bolivia continúe avanzando sobre lo logrado hasta ahora en esta materia.

²⁵ Informe de actividades de la Unión Europea en Bolivia 2007 - 2013

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/bolivia/documents/eu_bolivia/2007_2013_informe.actividades_es.pdf

3. **Integración y diversidad** a partir de la propia experiencia integradora de la Unión Europea, con expresiones en el ámbito de la cultura, la ciencia y el deporte para fomentar el diálogo intercultural y la tolerancia. Cabe recordar que Europa no solamente es una entidad de 27 estados, en muchos casos muy diferentes, sino que también dentro de estos hay minorías tradicionales y grandes comunidades de migrantes de origen muy diverso. El Grupo Europeo de Cultura y Comunicación organiza actividades como el Encuentro Musical Boliviano-Europeo el Festival de Cine Europeo y la Semana Universitaria Europea

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Two Priorities of Brazilian Foreign Policy: United Nations Security Council Reform and Responsibility While Protecting (RwP)

Lucian Bălăţescu²⁶

Brazil has emerged, especially over the last decade, as an important regional player, both politically and economically. Brazil, the seventh economic power of the world according to the GDP, a country that represents almost half of South and Central Americas' economy, tries to assert itself as regional leader and to get in the first ranks of the worldwide decision making process just as well. This article presents Brazil's arguments for being accepted, along with other important regional players (Germany, Japan and India), in an extended United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It also presents the main principles of Brazilian foreign policy and an initiative of the South-American country that could change the way the next peace-keeping missions of the United Nations will take place: Responsibility while Protecting (RwP).

1. A brief presentation of Brazil and its foreign policy after re-democratization (1985-2013)

1.1. Presidencies of Tancredo Neves and José Sarney (1985-1990)

The re-democratization of Brazil started in 1985 with the election of Tancredo Neves as President, after more than two decades of military dictatorship (1964-1985). Even though Neves was not elected by popular vote, as required by the opponents of the military government, but by an Electoral College that continued to abide by the regulations imposed by the military regime, his election was by all means a step forward towards democracy.

Neves acted as Prime-Minister between 1961 and 1962, during the Presidency of João Goulart, the last freely elected President of Brazil before the military coup of March 31st, 1964. He was, between 1964 and 1979, a member of Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), one of the only two parties allowed by the

²⁶ Department of Economic and Political Analysis, Embassy of Brazil.

military leaders solely to act as a façade of democracy to the regime, the other being the National Renewal Alliance Party (ARENA), who supported the militaries.

In 1979, the military government allowed the creation of new parties, and most of the MDB members, including Neves, formed the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB). This process of gradual re-democratization allowed by the military government, that would culminate with the election of Neves on January 15th, 1985, was known as *abertura* (opening). Nevertheless, the process of re-democratization would not be complete until the approval of the new Brazilian Constitution in 1988.

Sadly (but not paradoxically, according to some adepts of the conspiracy theory), Tancredo Neves got severely ill on March 14th, only a day before he was supposed to take the oath of office in front of the National Congress as the first President of what was named The New Republic (*Nova República*). The Vice-President-elect, José Sarney, was the only one to sworn in. As a consequence, he became Acting President. Tancredo Neves died on April 21st, without ever acting as President. Yet, as an homage, the Congress passed a law officially including Neves on the list of Brazilian Presidents.

José Sarney, a lawyer and writer (among his books translated into Romanian must be mentioned “Apele de miazanoapte”, Ed. Univers, 1986; “Stapanul marii”, Ed. Fundatiei Culturale Romane, 1997; “Saraminda”, Ed. Vis Print, 2001), acted as President until March 15th, 1990, during a period of intense transformation not only in Brazil, but also in the rest of the world.

Due to its internal and foreign policy, and also for being the first post-military era President, José Sarney was called the President of the Democracy (*O Presidente da Democracia*), name he kept as a logo for his official blog (<http://josesarney.org>). He is still active in politics. He was President of the Brazilian Senate for four terms, the last one during 2011-2012. Currently he is a Senator for the State of Amapá (Brazil is a federation composed of 26 States and one Federal District).

Within its borders, the newly democratized Brazil was fighting huge economic problems, the 1980's being known as the Lost Decade (*Década Perdida*). Sarney tried to contain the rampant inflation through the "*Plano Cruzado*", a large monetary reform that included the creation of a new currency, the Cruzado, which was temporarily successful. Yet, the inflation got out of control again and reached almost 2000% in 1989.

The mandate of José Sarney, the first civil President of Brazil after 21 years of military regime, was also marked by severe inequalities in wealth distribution (problem that would only be tackled with some notable success during the mandates of Inácio Lula da Silva, 2003-2010, and Dilma Rousseff, since 2011). In 1985, the external debt²⁷ was reaching USD 96 billion, or 32% of the GDP, with an external debt service of almost 5% of the GDP. By the end of his mandate, in 1990, the foreign debt remained in absolute terms at the same level, of around USD 96 billion, but decreased to 23% of the GDP, with an external debt service of less than 2% of the GDP (for comparison, at the end of 2012 the external debt was of USD 405 billion, that is, less than 19% of the GDP). The external debt service, due to the difficulties of the new democratic government to roll the debt contracted by their predecessors, was consuming almost all export earnings (50% of the exports in 1985, 26% in 1990), making the international creditors apprehensive about a possible Brazilian default. In fact, Sarney, after failing to complete various financing agreements signed with the IMF, unilaterally decided in 1987 to stop paying interest rates to the foreign debt and to keep paying back to the international creditors only the principal, of around USD 2 billion.

At the same time, the reforms imposed by the IMF were harshly criticized by the population. A popular yet sad joke among Brazilians was that the initials of the IMF (FMI in Portuguese) came from "*Fome, Miséria, Injustiça*" (hunger, misery, injustice).

²⁷ Ceres Aires Cerqueira, *Dívida Externa. Processo negocial. 1983-1996*, Banco Central do Brasil, Brasília, 1996, p. 144-149.

Nonetheless, the economic reforms and austerity measures applied during the 1990's and 2000's eventually paid back. Brazil is actually nowadays a net international creditor and has recently increased its contribution as a financier of the International Monetary Fund. Some analysts even consider that the way Brazil overcame its problems, not only by avoiding a default (like the one of Argentina in 2001), but also by turning from a “trouble maker” into a regional leader, should be taken as an example of how to solve the current financial crisis, including in the Euro zone²⁸.

In a speech delivered in 1986, José Sarney defined the following principles and priorities of Brazil's foreign policy after re-democratization²⁹:

- emergence of a new world economic order, more reasonable and balanced, that could address the external debt problem;
- prioritization of the relations with Latin American countries;
- intensification of the relations with African countries and rejection of the *apartheid*;
- development of the relations with Asian countries;
- improvement of the cooperation with planned economies (communist countries);
- strengthening of the UN, OAS (Organization of American States) and other international organizations;
- enhancement of the relations with the USA and Western Europe, with which “Brazil shares a wide range of common values”.

The Presidency of José Sarney witnessed the last years of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the only superpower. Sarney took office almost concomitantly with Mikhail Gorbachev, whose *glasnost* and *perestroika* policies,

²⁸ Charles de Chassiron, *Debt Crisis - Déjà Vu? Brazil in the '80s* - <http://www.ibde.org/component/content/article/94-debt-crisis-deja-vu-brazil-in-the-80s.html>

²⁹ Fernando de Mello Barreto, *A política externa após a redemocratização*, Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão – FUNAG, Brasília, 2012, Vol. 1, p. 56-57.

among other factors, led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the consequent dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991. Economic and political globalization was becoming more of a fact and less of a theory, and the newly democratized Brazil intended to be part of the new global scenario.

Olavo Setubal, in his assumption speech as Minister of External Relations (MRE) in the Government of José Sarney between 1985-1986, declared that “never, in our history as an independent nation, has the connection to the rest of the world been more vital”³⁰ and was asked that Brazilian foreign policy be based on the principle “diplomacy of results”³¹.

Abreu Sodré, the second Minister of External Relations of José Sarney (between 1986 and 1990), summarized the foreign policy of the first President after the military regime in a few words³²: by its return to democracy, Brazil won “solid credentials” in a “disappearing” world whose foundations have been shaken by the imminent disappearance of the USSR and by the collapse of the Berlin Wall and of the “wall that hid Mandela”.

1.2. Presidencies of Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco (1990-1994)

In 1991, following the model of the European integration, yet at a less complex level, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay created Mercosul (Spanish: Mercosur), the Common Market of the South. It was one of the first steps that Brazil has taken towards becoming a regional leader. In the following years, Brazil supported the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a project that

³⁰ <http://www.olavosetubal.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Olavo-Setubal-no-Senado-Federal.pdf>

³¹ <http://www.olavosetubal.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/DISCURSO-PRONUNCIADO-POR-OCASIAO-DA-CERIMONIA-DE-TRANSMISSAO-DE-POSSE-NO-CARGO-DE-MINISTRO-DE-EST.pdf>

³² *Abreu Sodré transmite cargo a Francisco Rezek* (Discurso proferido pelo Ministro Abreu Sodré por ocasião da cerimônia de transmissão de cargo de Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, no Palácio Itamaraty, em 15 de março de 1990), in *Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*, vol. 64, Jan-Mar 1990. Also available as digital copy at http://cafemundorama.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/rpeb_64_jan_fev_mar_1990.pdf.

never got implemented. Subsequently, Brazil played an increasing role in other regional integration processes, such as UNASUL (Union of Nations of South America) and CELAC (Community of States of Latin America and the Caribbean)

In spite of the increasing presence of Brazil in the international arena, its economic problems continued during the presidencies of Fernando Collor (1990–1992) and Itamar Franco (1992–1994). The hyperinflation remained a constant problem, reaching almost 2500% in 1993, one year before the adoption of the “*Plano Real*” of economic macro-stabilization, conceived by then Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who would become President of Brazil between 1995 and 2002.

At the same time, Brazil was being confronted with high levels of corruption, considered to a certain extent normal in a country still struggling its way out of a military dictatorship and towards democracy. Fernando Collor, the first President freely elected by popular suffrage, according to the new Constitution of 1988 (as mentioned, Tancredo Neves and his Vice-President, then President José Sarney have been elected by an Electoral College), was impeached for corruption on October 2nd, 1992, and his Vice-President, Itamar Franco, took office until the end of 1994.

During the mandates of Francisco Rezek (1990–1992), Celso Lafer (1992), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1992–1993) and Celso Amorim (1993–1995) as Foreign Ministers, the world witnessed events such as the reunification of Germany; the first steps towards re-democratization in Eastern Europe; the first wars in ex-Yugoslavia; the rise of the USA as the only superpower; the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the first Gulf War; the independence of Namibia and the end of the *apartheid* regime in South Africa; the violence in Somalia; and the increased democratization and integration of Latin American nations, despite some coups, successful or not, such as the ones in Peru, Venezuela or Haiti.

In this new world scenario, and in spite of its domestic problems, Brazil went on trying to strengthen its international voice, by promoting a new type of diplomacy.

As stated by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Foreign Minister in 1992-1993 and President of Brazil between 1995-2002, “We have a universal vocation and, thanks to this, we have a greater ease to diversify our partners. We have the conditions to promote a diversified and universalistic diplomacy”³³.

1.3. Presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002)

Due to the initial success of the *Plano Real*, whose main architect has been as Finance Minister (1993-1994), Fernando Henrique Cardoso won the 1994 Presidential elections against the candidate of the left, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Cardoso, an adept of the neoliberalism³⁴, continued the process, initiated by Fernando Collor, of (re)insertion of Brazil in the globalization process. An intellectual who was opposing “traditional politics” and an adept of the “presidential diplomacy”³⁵, FHC, as he was also known by his co-nationals, defined as priorities, among other objectives of Brazilian foreign policy, the advance of integration within Mercosul; the diversification of foreign partners; and the increase of Brazil’s presence in the international organizations.

The main international event during Cardoso’s Presidency was undoubtedly the 9/11 terrorist attacks of Al-Qaida and the subsequent reaction of the US and their allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, another series of events from the 1995-2002 period had influenced the shape of the Brazilian Foreign Policy of that period: the increasing role of the European Union as a regional player, mainly after the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995) and the adoption of the euro (1999); the increasing role of OTAN in conflict resolution, especially during the wars in ex-Yugoslavia; the rising of China as major regional and later global player (including the retrocession of Hong Kong, in 1997, and Macau, in 1999); and the

³³ Fernando de Mello Barreto, *A política externa após a redemocratização*, Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão – FUNAG, Brasília, 2012, Vol. 1, p. 239.

³⁴ Paulo Fagundes Vizentini, *De FHC a Lula: uma década de política externa (1995-2002)*. In *Civitas – Revista de Políticas Sociais*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2005), PUCRS, Rio Grande do Sul, p. 382. Available in digital format at <http://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/ojs/index.php/civitas/article/download/9/1602>.

³⁵ Idem.

growing “democratization” of the international trade, by the creation of the World Trade Organization (1995).

During his two mandates as President of Brazil, Cardoso had two Ministers of External Relations: Luiz Felipe Lampreia (January 1995-January 2001) and Calsol Lafer (January 2001-December 2002).

In the speech delivered during the swearing in ceremony, on January 1st, 1995, Cardoso said that “in the post-Cold War era, the importance of countries like Brazil does not depend only on military and strategic factors, but especially on domestic political stability, general level of well-being, vital status of the economy (...) and clear, objective and viable diplomatic proposals”³⁶. He added that at that moment Brazil was at the crossroads of three processes of transformation: consolidation of democracy; further opening of the economy to international trade; and economic stabilization, based on the Real Plan. This process of economic macro-stabilization was maintained especially during the first mandate of President Cardoso (1995-1998), when Brazil, in spite of the Mexican (1995), Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) economic crises, and thanks to the US\$ 41 billion credit received from the IMF in November 1998, managed to implement various reforms (including the liberalization of the exchange rate of the real, in 1999) and show signs of recovery³⁷.

Cardoso mentioned that Brazil was a country with a traditional pacific diplomacy, a democratic and multiracial society, ranking fifth in the world both from a territorial (8,5 million sq.km.) and a demographical (160 million inhabitants in 1995, over 200 million inhabitants in 2013) point of view. Brazil, “as a country who reconquered its tranquility and self-confidence”, was “ready to assume new international responsibilities”, stated Cardoso.

³⁶ <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/fernando-henrique-cardoso/discursos-de-posse/discurso-de-posse-1o-mandato/download>

³⁷ Fernando de Mello Barreto, *A política externa após a redemocratização*, Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão – FUNAG, Brasília, 2012, Vol. 1, p. 355-356.

Cardoso and his collaborators also insisted on the predictability of Brazilian Foreign Policy. Ambassador Sebastião do Rego Barros, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Relations, warned, in 1996, that “acting as a pendulum, making decisions on the spur of the moment, showing ideological fluctuations and diplomatic opportunism” are elements that “corrode and undermine a country’s external credibility”³⁸. Following this principle, the main lines of action of the Brazilian Foreign Policy during the mandates of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (8 years) were the following:

- consolidation of regional cooperation, especially within Mercosul;
- defense of Brazilian interests within other integration processes in the Western Hemisphere, with emphasis on the FTAA, in parallel with the intensification of the cooperation with the European Union;
- consolidation of a network of bilateral strategic partnerships with important countries;
- increased emphasis on domestic development, including the access to high technology;
- respect for human rights and the environment;
- defense of the international law, including the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

At the end of his 6-year mandate, Luiz Felipe Lampreia, currently a blogger³⁹ specialized in international politics for Organizações Globo⁴⁰, was proud to declare, on January 29th, 2001, that Brazil “got closer to the central route of the international scenario”. Almost two years later, in December 18th, 2002, Celso Lafer declared that his 2-year mandate was marked by two fundamental issues. The first one was “to continue the development of Brazil and carry on the international economic and commercial negotiations without harming the national interests, amid a new international security scenario”. The second issue was to

³⁸ Idem, p. 361-362.

³⁹ <http://oglobo.globo.com/blogs/lampreia/>

⁴⁰ The biggest and most influential mass media group in Latin America.

“avoid the risk of international isolation of Brazil, due to the new tendencies of the international system”⁴¹. Lafer insisted on the necessity of “openness”, arguing that “nowadays autonomy is not built by isolation, but by being part of the world”. We must bear in mind that this declaration occurred in the second year of “post 9/11 era”, in a period marked by US and allied countries interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

1.4. Presidencies of José Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (since 2011). Current principles of Brazilian foreign policy.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks marked a complete change of paradigm in international relations, and Brazil took the opportunity to play an increasing role in this new environment. The financial crisis started in 2008 and the rise of new economic powers, such as China, and to a certain extent, India, Brazil and others, accompanied by the subsequent relative decrease of the US hegemony, also constituted important arguments for Brazil’s pledge for a permanent seat in the UNSC and for assuming a central role in addressing important international issues (e.g., the Brazil’s attempt, together with Turkey, to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear file, or the introduction of new concepts in international relations, such as Responsibility while Protecting).

Brazilian foreign policy shaped its present form during the presidencies of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010, with Celso Amorim as Foreign Minister) and Dilma Rousseff (since 2011, with Antonio de Aguiar Patriota as Foreign Minister until August 2013 and Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado since then), and was influenced by the main events of this period: the terrorist attacks against the US homeland (2001) and the wars in Iraq (starting in 2003) and Afghanistan (since 2001); the Middle East conflicts (especially the Lebanon War of 2006 and Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007); the initiation of Iranian nuclear program; the

⁴¹ Fernando de Mello Barreto, *A política externa após a redemocratização*, Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão – FUNAG, Brasília, 2012, Vol. 1, p. 712-713.

first (2006) and second (2009) nuclear tests of North Korea; the enlargement of the European Union with new members (2004 and 2007); the world economic crisis of 2008 and subsequent years.

Even apparently only regional events like the suspension, by Russia, of its natural gas deliveries to Europe during the 2008-2009 winter, had a certain influence on Brazil's economic policy. Just like Russia, Brazil tries to become an important global player on the energy market, due to its newly discovered offshore oil resources, like Lula Oilfield⁴² (formerly Tupi) or Libra Oilfield. The latter is "estimated to contain between eight billion and 12 billion barrels of oil, and the government has proclaimed it could generate \$1 trillion in public revenue over 30 years"⁴³. Brazil also invested heavily in the protection of the environment, trying to increase from 32% in 2006 to at least 41% in 2030⁴⁴ the ratio of the "clean energy" (mainly based on hydro, ethanol and other renewable sources) in its energy matrix.

Domestic developments in Brazil also had a strong influence on the country's foreign policy over the last decade. Both social-democrats and members of the Laborers' Party, Presidents Lula and Rousseff paid special attention to economic and social aspects, trying to reduce the high inequality in the distribution of income and to meet the Millennium Development Goals⁴⁵. Ambitious projects of public and private investments, mainly in infrastructure, were conceived. Like the rest of the world, Brazil was hit by the world economic crisis at the end of 2008 and in the first part of 2009, but the impact was a lot softer than in most developed and developing countries and the recovery of the economy was a lot faster. In 2012, Brazil had the fifth largest economy in the world, with a nominal GDP of

⁴² <http://oilpro.com/project/1517/lula>

⁴³ <http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20131021-708011.html>

⁴⁴ http://www.dwih.com.br/fileadmin/user_upload/2011/Geosciences/01_13_KN_Petrobras_LulaOilField.pdf

⁴⁵ For a detailed view on the stage of implementation of the Millennium Development Goals in Brazil from their adoption, in September 2000, till the middle of the first mandate of President Lula, see Lucian Băltătescu, *Brazilia si Obiectivele de Dezvoltare ale Mileniului*, in *Economistul*, 2nd, 3rd and 6th of December, 2004.

around US\$ 2.4 trillion⁴⁶. The economic performance is expected to improve over the next years, when Brazil will host two important international events: Soccer World Cup, in 2014, and Summer Olympic Games, in 2016.

Due to all these constant improvements of economic and social indicators, Brazil allowed itself to assign more resources, both financial and diplomatic, to its foreign policy, whose principles can nowadays be systematized as follows⁴⁷:

- abiding by the main international principles: national sovereignty of states, respect to human rights, obedience to international law, non-intervention in internal affairs of other states without the consent of the UN and only in case of the violation of the first principles, pacific resolution of conflicts, prevalence of peace and cooperation between states, rejection of racism, terrorism, human trafficking and similar problems;
- strengthening the integration process of South American nations, with Mercosul as the center of this process; in this respect, the balancing of the asymmetries among Mercosul members should be the main concern over medium and long term; other cooperation formats, like UNASUL⁴⁸ or CELAC⁴⁹, are also a priority of the Brazilian foreign policy;
- amplifying commercial links and economic cooperation with other geographical regions (Central America, Caribbean and Africa) and further enlargement of Brazil's cooperation with other emerging economies (the so called South-South cooperation), mainly within the framework of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), but also in other cooperation formats, such as IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa);

⁴⁶ IMF – World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013 –

<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx>

⁴⁷ Brasil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático - *Repertório de Política Externa: Posições do Brasil* - Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão – FUNAG, Brasília, 2007, p.17-26. Various speeches of Presidents Lula and Rousseff and their Ministers of External Relation were also consulted. Most of them are publicly available for download on the “Notícias” section of the Presidency of Brazil website (www.presidencia.gov.br).

⁴⁸ Union of Latin American Nations.

⁴⁹ Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

- improving the dialogue with the USA and their Western allies with respect to global issues;
- implementing national and international policies for greater cooperation in the fields where Brazil has a world known experience, such as biofuels, deep-water oil drilling, addressing of environmental issues and various areas of science and technology;
- supporting a broad reform of the UN in order to allow a better reflection of today's realities.

Maybe one of the best abstracts of the current objectives of the Brazilian foreign policy was made on August 28th, 2013, by Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, at the ceremony of handing over the position of Foreign Minister to Ambassador Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado. In his speech⁵⁰, Patriota reminded that during his mandate as Foreign Minister (that January 2011 and July 2013), he “participated in more than 180 events overseas, among bilateral visits and multilateral events”, while “Ministers of Foreign Affairs visited Brazil on 91 occasions”. In the same period, President Dilma Rousseff went on 37 trips abroad and received 48 visits of foreign Heads of State and Government. “Those are significant numbers which reflect Brazil’s new standard of international engagement”, declared Patriota. And he added: “As a result, we have achieved important international positions, as attested by the election of Brazilians to the World Trade Organization⁵¹ and the United Nations Food and Agriculture

⁵⁰ *Discurso do Embaixador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota na cerimônia de posse do Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores* (Palácio do Planalto, 28 de agosto de 2013), <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/ministro-estado-relacoes-exteriores/discurso-do-embaixador-antonio-de-aguiar-patriota-na-cerimonia-de-posse-do-ministro-de-estado-das-relacoes-exteriores-palacio-do-planalto-28-de-agosto-de-2013>.

⁵¹ Ambassador Roberto Azevêdo assumed office as the sixth Director-General of the WTO on 1 September 2013 for a four-year term. Between 2008 and 2013, Azevêdo has been the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the WTO and other International Economic Organisations in Geneva, such as the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Between 2006 and 2008, as Vice-Minister for Economic and Technological Affairs, he was Brazil’s chief-negotiator for the Doha Round and supervised MERCOSUR’s trade negotiations with other groupings or countries outside Latin America.

Organization⁵². (...) During my tenure, Brazil won all the international elections for which it presented candidacies”.

On the same occasion⁵³, the new Foreign Minister and ex-Ambassador of Brazil at the United Nations, Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado, talked about the “international weight of Brazil” and the strengthening of the country’s international credibility, concluding that “Brazil is a fundamental player and leader on the international scene” and guaranteeing that “Brazil’s relevance (...) has come to stay”.

2. Brazil and the United National Security Council Reform⁵⁴

On September 21, 2004, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (President of Brazil), Manmohan Singh (Prime-Minister of India), Junichiro Koizumi (Prime-Minister of Japan) and Joschka Fischer (Vice-Chancellor of Germany), published a joint press communiqué announcing the creation of “G-4”, a new cooperation structure (although not yet institutionalized) whose main purpose was to promote the UNSC reform by “including developing and developed countries as new permanent members”. Another objective was to also increase the number of non-permanent members of the UNSC. Since then, the G-4 continued to meet every year in New York, during the General Assembly of the UN, and analyze the progress of their endeavor.

⁵² Ambassador José Graziano da Silva was elected Director-General of FAO on 26 June 2011. His term runs from 1 January 2012 to 31 July 2015. In 2001 he led the team that designed Brazil’s “Zero Hunger” (Fome Zero) programme. In 2003, he was charged with its implementation by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva who named him Special Minister of Food Security and the Fight against Hunger.

⁵³ *Discurso do Embaixador Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado na cerimônia de posse do Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores* (Palácio do Planalto, 28 de agosto de 2013), <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/ministro-estado-relacoes-exteriores/discurso-do-embaixador-luiz-alberto-figueiredo-machado-na-cerimonia-de-posse-do-ministro-de-estado-das-relacoes-exteriores-palacio-do-planalto-28-de-agosto-de-2013>.

⁵⁴ All of the documents referred to in this chapter, including G4 Ministerial Declarations, can be accessed in the “Documents” section of the website <http://csnu.itamaraty.gov.br>, unless otherwise specified. The timeline of the negotiations, although representing public knowledge, is based on the excellent compilation available on the same website, where there is also available an exhaustive bibliography on the issue, mainly from a Brazilian point of view, in the “Bibliographical Reference” section.

Brazil, Germany, India and Japan asked to become permanent members of the UNSC, invoking a series of arguments (see below). Yet, almost 10 years after the initial proposal, the issue is still under debate, since the “big five” (the so-called P-5 group of the current five Permanent Members of the UNSC – China, France, Great Britain, Russian Federation and USA) were not very open to the idea of sharing their powers, including the veto right, with other regional powers, irrespective of their arguments.

At the same time, regional rivals also started a campaign to prevent Brazil, Germany, India and Japan from becoming permanent members with veto power. For example, the “Uniting for Consensus” group (UfC)⁵⁵, rejects any multiplication of the permanent members of the Council, but encourages an increase of the elected non-permanent members to no less than twenty⁵⁶.

The opposition to the reform of the UNSC became even harsher after the G-4, besides their own places, asked for an additional increase of the number of permanent seats, arguing that “Africa must be also represented in the permanent membership in the Security Council”. Initially, the G-4 suggested that Africa should receive two seats, which would have meant a new UNSC with 11 permanent members (P-5, G-4 and two African states). Nevertheless, the African Union (the so-called AU / C-10 group) proved unable, since the G-4 Declaration of 2004, to reach a consensus about Africa’s two proposals from a “short list” of three countries (Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa), even if such a choice would have seemed somehow easier to be made after the recent developments in Egypt.

⁵⁵ As of July 2005, when presented the A/59/L.68 Draft Resolution (http://csnu.itamaraty.gov.br/images/21_A_59_L_68_Uniting_for_Consensus.pdf), the UfC was formed by Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey.

⁵⁶ “France, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect twenty other members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution” – United Nations, 59th General Assembly Plenary, 115th Meeting – Press Release GA/10371 – <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10371.doc.htm>

Consequently, the question of African seats remained somehow unclear. Yet, recent documents continue to speak about “no less than two permanent seats for Africa”⁵⁷.

Besides the increase from 5 to 9 or 11 permanent members, the G-4 also asked for an increase of the number of non-permanent member states, from 10 to at least 15. The four countries argued that the partial reform of the UNSC of 1963-1965, when the number of non-permanent members of the UNSC was increased from 6 to 10, was already 40 years old and that the Security Council was no longer “representative, legitimate and effective” (between 1965 and 2004 the number of UN member states grew from 117 to 191, reaching 193 in 2013, which means a 65% increase⁵⁸).

In their joint press statement of 2004, Brazil, Germany, India and Japan argued that “in order for the international community to effectively address the various threats and challenges that it presently faces, it is important to reform the United Nations as a whole”. The G-4 communiqué showed that “the Security Council must reflect the realities of the international community in the 21st Century. (...) It is essential that the Security Council include, on a permanent basis, countries that have the will and the capacity to take on major responsibilities with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security”.

The four countries also claimed that there has been a “nearly four-fold increase in the membership of the United Nations since its inception in 1945, including a sharp increase in the number of developing countries”, but, despite this, the number of Permanent Members of the UNSC is blocked to only five⁵⁹. As a

⁵⁷ Letter addressed on April 12, 2013, by Zahir Tanin, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations and Chair of the “Intergovernmental Negotiations on the equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council”, to the General Assembly of the UN.

⁵⁸ <http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml>

⁵⁹ Celso Amorim, Foreign Minister of Brazil during Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010), showed that if in 1945 the composition of the Security Council represented 20% of the total number of members, this proportion dropped to 15% after the increase of the number on non-permanent members in 1965 and plummeted to less than 8% in 2010. Celso Amorim, *A reforma da ONU*, http://www.iea.usp.br/publicacoes/textos/amorimonu.pdf/at_download/file.

consequence, Brazil, Germany India and Japan announced that, “based on the firmly shared recognition that they are legitimate candidates for permanent membership in an expanded Security Council, they support each other's candidatures”.

Almost 10 years later, in a Joint Press Statement⁶⁰ issued after the Ministerial Meeting of the G4 Countries in the margins of the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly (New York, September 26th, 2013), the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan “underscored that, almost 70 years after the creation of the United Nations, reform of the Security Council is long overdue”. They “agreed that difficulties of the Security Council in dealing with international challenges, including current ones, have further highlighted the need for U.N. Security Council reform in order to better reflect geopolitical realities of the 21st century and make the Council more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions”.

The G-4 Foreign Ministers reiterated the need for a reformed Security Council, “taking into consideration the contributions made by these countries to the maintenance of international peace and security and other purposes of the organization, as well as the need for increased representation of developing countries in both categories⁶¹, in order to better reflect today’s geopolitical realities”. They also “reaffirmed their view of the importance of developing countries, in particular Africa, to be represented in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of an enlarged Council”.

⁶⁰ <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/reuniao-ministerial-do-g4-brasil-alemanha-india-e-japao-a-margem-da-68a-assembleia-geral-das-nacoes-unidas-comunicado-conjunto-nova-york-26-de-setembro-2013>

⁶¹ Permanent and non-permanent members.

Finally, the Ministers “recalled that almost 10 years ago, in the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit⁶², international leaders committed themselves to an early reform of the Security Council” and “stressed the need to intensify efforts to translate, at the latest by 2015, the existing agreement into concrete outcomes”.

It is not the first time, in the almost 10 years passed since the first joint press declaration of the G-4 that the four countries try to set a deadline for the UN to produce “concrete outcomes”. Although, due to the diplomatic efforts of the four countries, some progress on the issue has been made over the last decade, a breakthrough that would give a new momentum to the negotiations, since none of the previous deadlines⁶³ has been respected, is still necessary.

Such breakthrough was expected to finally be achieved during the current (68th) General Assembly of the UN, by the “Open-ended Working Group of the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Council”, created back in 1993, by General Assembly Resolution 48/26⁶⁴. The group, “which is advisory in nature and does not have a negotiating role, was expected to produce a basis for the start of official intergovernmental negotiations” on the issue, which were set to begin on November 15th, 2013, or “as early as is feasible thereafter”⁶⁵. Till the end of November, nonetheless, no results of the negotiations have been officially made public.

⁶² Resolution 60/1 (“2005 World Summit Outcome”), adopted at the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly –

http://csnu.itamaraty.gov.br/images/30._A.RES.60.1_2005_World_Summit_Outcome.pdf.

⁶³ For example, in the Resolution 60/1, the UN member states affirmed that “we support early reform of the Security Council - an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations - in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions. We commit ourselves to continuing our efforts to achieve a decision to this end and request the General Assembly to review progress on the reform set out above by the end of 2005” (page 32, item 153).

⁶⁴ http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/48/26&Lang=E

⁶⁵ http://csnu.itamaraty.gov.br/images/Carta_do_PGA_22out2013.pdf

3. Responsibility While Protecting

In paragraphs 138 and 139 of the “2005 World Summit Outcome” (GA Resolution 60/1)⁶⁶, the United Nations defined the concept of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) as follows:

"138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. (...)

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. (...)"

As defined by GA Resolution 60/1, "responsibility to protect" must be implemented on three levels, in this exact order of precedence:

- 1) by the State itself, which is the main responsible to protect its population from such crimes;
- 2) by the international community, by providing cooperation and assistance to the State to develop the capacities required on paragraph 1;
- 3) by the international community, who is entitled to take collective action, in accordance with the norms and procedures established in the Charter

⁶⁶ http://csnu.itamaraty.gov.br/images/30_A.RES.60.1_2005_World_Summit_Outcome.pdf.

of the United Nations, if the State was not able or not willing to comply with the situations defined on paragraphs 1 and 2.

This means that the force must be used only as a measure of last resort and only if three sets of conditions are met⁶⁷:

- 1) material (first the existence of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity must be proved);
- 2) temporal (first it must be demonstrated that the State was not able or willing to exercise its own responsibility to protect its population and all peaceful means have been exhausted);
- 3) formal (the use of force by the international community must be approved by the Security Council, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations and based on evaluation on a case-by-case basis).

The limitation of R2P became obvious in the conflicts that surged after 2005, since the military interventions, even approved by the UN, by themselves or by their side effects, produced sometimes more violence and damage to civil population in affected areas than the original situation that made necessary the collective action (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity).

Based on this idea, President Dilma Rousseff introduced in September 2011, during the 66th General Assembly of the United Nations, the concept of “responsibility while protecting” (RwP). The concept was therefore further developed in a concept note⁶⁸ circulated by Brazil on November 11th, 2011, as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. Brazil pointed out the lacks of the R2P concept, showing that “it is essential to distinguish between

⁶⁷ See UN document A/66/551 – S/2011/701 - “Responsibility while protecting: elements for the development and promotion of a concept” - <http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/Concept-Paper-RwP.pdf>.

⁶⁸ See previous note.

collective responsibility, which can be fully exercised through non-coercive measures, and collective security”; that “needless to say, it is necessary to clearly differentiate between military and non-military coercion, with a view to avoiding the precipitous use of force” and that “even when warranted on the grounds of justice, legality and legitimacy, military action results in high human and material costs”. It also draws the attention of the international community to the fact that “the world today suffers the painful consequences of interventions that have aggravated existing conflicts, allowed terrorism to penetrate into places where it previously did not exist, given rise to new cycles of violence and increased the vulnerability of civilian populations”. Brazil concludes that “the international community, as it exercises its responsibility to protect (R2P), must demonstrate a high level of responsibility while protecting (RwP)” and that both concepts should evolve together, based on an agreed set of fundamental principles, parameters and procedures, such as the following:

- i. Prevention is always the best policy. It is the emphasis on preventive diplomacy that reduces the risk of armed conflict and the human costs associated with it;
- ii. The international community must be rigorous in its efforts to exhaust all peaceful means available in the protection of civilians under threat of violence, in line with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as embodied in the 2005 Outcome Document;
- iii. The use of force, including in the exercise of the responsibility to protect, must always be authorized by the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, or, in exceptional circumstances, by the General Assembly under its Resolution 377 (V);
- iv. The authorization for the use of force must be limited in its legal, operational and temporal elements. The scope of military action must abide by the letter and the spirit of the mandate conferred by the

UNSC or the UNGA, and be carried out in strict conformity with International Law, in particular International Humanitarian Law and the International Law of Armed Conflicts;

- v. The use of force must produce as little violence and instability as possible. Under no circumstances can it generate more harm than it was authorized to prevent;
- vi. In the event the use of force is contemplated, action must be judicious, proportionate and limited to the objectives established by the Security Council;
- vii. These guidelines must be observed throughout the entire length of the authorization, from the adoption of the resolution to the suspension of the authorization by a new resolution;
- viii. Enhanced UNSC procedures are needed to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented to ensure responsibility while protecting;
- ix. The Security Council must ensure the accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force.

Brazil's proposition - that it was not trying to replace but to improve the R2P concept, was generally received with interest by the international community. Yet, the United States, the United Kingdom and France showed some opposition, for example when most of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) criticized the fact that the civilian protection mandate approved by UNSC Resolution 1973 had been exceeded during military intervention in Libya⁶⁹. Brazil, Germany, India, Russia and China, all members of the UNSC in 2011, abstained from voting the resolution, while South Africa voted in favor, along with the US, the UK, France and 6 non-permanent members of the Council at that time (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria and Portugal). The UNSC

⁶⁹ Gareth Evans, *R2P down but not out after Libya and Syria* - <http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/gareth-evans/r2p-down-but-not-out-after-libya-and-syria>

Resolution 1973 was adopted in March 2011, a few months before Brazil officially launched the RWP, and the side-effects of the military intervention in Lybia constituted without doubt a catalyst for the Brazilian proposal.

On January 18th, 2012, the Stanley Foundation organized, in New York, the conference entitled “R2P: The Next Decade”⁷⁰, with the participation of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and experts from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the Centre for Conflict Resolution and the International Crisis Group, among others. Agreeing with the Brazilian Government, the participants pointed out the limitation of the R2P concept and asked for an evaluation and refinement of its specific tools, in order to determine which are best suited to particular contexts and how they can best be applied⁷¹.

They also concurred that “the Libyan campaign generated genuine distrust among some member states over future applications of R2P-inspired mandates, a distrust that continues to haunt debate over Security Council action in Syria”. Finally, many participants welcomed the Brazilian initiative to consider “responsibility while protecting”, “which reflects many of the issues at the core of current concerns” related to “responsibility to protect”.

The international mass-media and academic community also paid attention to the Brazilian proposition. Some authors considered that RWP “was the Rouseff administration's finest multilateral initiative”, which “symbolized the very strategy Brazil aspired to pursue: turn into a bridge builder, mediator and consensus seeker”⁷². According so such analysts, the concept of “the responsibility while protecting” is an “interesting example of how Brazil is attempting to play the role as a mediator between the United States and Europe (which tend to be quick to recommend military intervention) on the one hand and reluctant BRICS members,

⁷⁰ <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/r2p.cfm>

⁷¹ http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/policy_memo/R2PNextDecadePM.pdf

⁷² Oliver Stuenkel, Brazil's enigmatic retreat: The case of the Responsibility while Protecting (RWP) - <http://www.postwesternworld.com/2013/08/01/brazils-enigmatic-retreat-the-case-of-the-responsibility-while-protecting-rwp/>

such as Russia and China on the other”⁷³. As some analysts⁷⁴ pointed out, Brazil “explicitly launched its bid to be recognized as a global player in the 1990’s” and, by its multifaceted diplomacy, expressed its “intent to confirm its upcoming status in the International System”. This is why the RwP represents an opportunity for the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations “to seal the deal of the country’s global player status, following the lead of Roberto Azevêdo’s election for the WTO’s top position”.

⁷³ Oliver Stuenkel, *BRICS and the “Responsibility while Protecting” concept* - <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/brics-and-the-responsibility-while-protecting-concept/article2985190.ece>

⁷⁴ Mariana Kalil, *The Responsibility While Protecting: a wake-up call for Brazil’s decision makers* - <http://theworldoutline.com/2013/06/responsibility-while-protecting-wake-up-call-brazil-decision-makers/>

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El Pacto por México y sus Reformas: tiempo de cambios?

Adriana Soto Yáñez⁷⁵

El presente trabajo tiene como objeto principal describir el acuerdo político llevado a cabo el pasado 2012 en el cual las tres principales fuerzas políticas en México convinieron suscribir un acuerdo integral de trabajo, el que mas tarde derivaría en la adopción de varias Reformas. El Pacto por México es el acuerdo más relevante que ha tenido lugar en décadas, implica generar grandes acciones y Reformas específicas que proyecten a México hacia un futuro más próspero,⁷⁶ busca situar al país en un lugar privilegiado en América Latina y fuera de la región, como referente de inclusión e impulsor de acuerdos políticos. Asimismo, se presentan las Reformas derivadas de dicho pacto, lo que a la fecha significa el mayor número de cambios estructurales en el sistema legislativo del país.

Qué es el Pacto por México?

Para conocer los alcances del acuerdo logrado debemos iniciar señalando que el sistema político en México está organizado en tres poderes: ejecutivo, legislativo y judicial. El poder legislativo se encuentra constituido por el Congreso de la Unión, el cual comprende dos Cámaras, la Cámara Alta compuesta por 128 Senadores y la Cámara Baja por 500 Diputados. En el Congreso coexisten siete partidos políticos: el Partido Revolucionario Institucional, el Partido Acción Nacional, El Partido de la Revolución Democrática, El Partido del Trabajo, el Partido Verde Ecologista, Movimiento Ciudadano y Nueva Alianza; aunque hay que decir que son siete partidos de muy distinto calado: tres institutos políticos mayores -los que han suscrito el pacto-, que conviven con otras cuatro organizaciones menores.⁷⁷

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⁷⁶ Pacto por México. <http://www.pactopormexico.org/>

⁷⁷ Mirón Lince, Rosa María. 2 de julio: reflexiones y alternativas. El PRI y el Sistema de Partidos en México. UNAM. México. 2007, pág. 209

El *Pacto por México* fue promovido desde el poder ejecutivo, el 2 de diciembre de 2012 el Presidente Enrique Peña Nieto se reunió en el Castillo de Chapultepec con los Presidentes de los partidos Acción Nacional, Revolucionario Institucional y de la Revolución Democrática para suscribir el acuerdo.⁷⁸ El objeto principal del Pacto es profundizar el proceso democrático con base en tres ejes rectores:

1. El fortalecimiento del Estado Mexicano
2. La democratización de la economía y la política, así como la ampliación y aplicación eficaz de los derechos sociales
3. La participación de los ciudadanos como actores fundamentales en el diseño, la ejecución y la evaluación de políticas públicas

El acuerdo busca mediar entre las principales fuerzas políticas del país, de ahí la importancia de lograr un consenso desde el principio de las negociaciones con convenios principalmente adoptados gracias a los integrantes de la mesa tripartita -*compuesta por los representantes de los tres principales partidos políticos*- con el *Pacto por México* se ha reconocido que existían muchas diferencias de criterios en las pluralidades de cada partido, que estas diferencias impedían concretar muchos acuerdos que, de haberse realizado, le permitirían a México avanzar aún más de lo que se logró en las dos últimas décadas.⁷⁹

Derivado de ese reconocimiento surgió el compromiso de intentar alcanzar un acuerdo que definiera las bases de un nuevo acuerdo que abarcara las esferas social, económica y política. Las Reformas buscan modernizar el sistema político del país, logrando avances en materias fundamentales para el desarrollo del mismo, la unidad partidaria inmersa en este compromiso es la herramienta fundamental para lograr dicho hito histórico.

El *Pacto por México* se encuentra dividido en 5 acuerdos:

⁷⁸ Presidencia de la República. Comunicados. Firma del Pacto por México.

<http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/articulos-prensa/firma-del-pacto-por-mexico/>

⁷⁹ Pacto por México. <http://www.pactopormexico.org/>

1. Acuerdos para una sociedad de derechos y libertades
2. Acuerdos para el crecimiento económico, el empleo y la competitividad
3. Acuerdos para la seguridad y la justicia
4. Acuerdos para la transparencia, rendición de cuentas y combate a la corrupción
5. Acuerdos para la gobernabilidad democrática.

Derivado del *Pacto por México* y tras la anuencia del Congreso de la Unión a la fecha se han aprobado las siguientes Reformas, entre otras:

Reforma Laboral. *Fecha de aprobación: noviembre 2012*

Esta Reforma busca brindar las mejores herramientas para fortalecer el sistema de protección y vigilancia en materia de derechos laborales. La Ley Federal del Trabajo es el ordenamiento actual que rige y define los derechos y obligaciones de los trabajadores y los empleadores en México, ante las modificaciones al marco jurídico laboral en el país se genera un cambio novedoso.

Con esta Reforma, México cuenta finalmente con una Ley Federal del Trabajo moderna y que responde a las necesidades actuales de trabajadores, empleadores y quienes aún no pueden acceder a un empleo y permite proteger efectivamente los derechos laborales, incrementar la productividad y competitividad de las empresas mexicanas, en especial las PYMES, además de acercar y agilizar la justicia laboral en beneficio de los trabajadores.⁸⁰

Existen 3 ejes principales en la Reforma Laboral:

1. El trabajo digno
2. La promoción del incremento de la competitividad en las empresas
3. La modernización de la justicia laboral

Esta Reforma contribuye a que el país sea percibido como ejemplo de avance democrático, interesado en modernizar sus instituciones. Las últimas Reformas

⁸⁰ Fuente: Embajada de México en Italia. Comunicados. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.
<http://www.sre.gob.mx>

realizadas a este rubro datan de 1970, por lo que no existieron cambios trascendentales en la materia en las últimas décadas, con esta Reforma, el impacto redundara directamente en la productividad y el crecimiento económico, sin dejar de lado el capital humano, otorgándosele más beneficios.

Reforma Educativa. *Fecha de aprobación: diciembre de 2012*

Esta Reforma busca implementar uno de los cinco ejes fundamentales del gobierno del Presidente Peña Nieto: *lograr un México con educación de calidad para todos*. Su objetivo principal es que las escuelas formen individuos libres, responsables y activos comprometidos con sus comunidades. Esta propuesta busca modernizar el marco jurídico para permitir el desarrollo de una educación de calidad y equidad.

El contenido de la reforma se concentra en dos ejes fundamentales:

1. Establecer las bases para la creación de un Servicio Profesional Docente, que defina los criterios de acceso, promoción y permanencia de los profesores, garantizando con ello la calidad de la educación.
2. Modernizar al Instituto Nacional para la Evaluación de la Educación con el fin de convertirlo en un órgano constitucional autónomo y dotarle así de atribuciones que le permitan evaluar los resultados del Sistema Educativo Nacional en su conjunto (docente, alumnos, personal administrativo, equipo y procesos).⁸¹

La Reforma Educativa da paso a reestructurar el sistema de educación en México, brindando la oportunidad única de lograr mejores cuadros docentes en el país y contribuir a establecer los estándares mínimos de calidad a todos los niveles de la educación. La estructura de la misma, promueve el mejoramiento constante y el máximo aprovechamiento de los estudiantes, con el Estado como el principal proveedor de los materiales y métodos educativos, la organización, la

⁸¹ Fuente: Consulado General de México en Atlanta. Comunicados. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. <http://www.sre.gob.mx>

infraestructura y la idoneidad de los docentes y directivos dentro de un marco de inclusión y diversidad.

Reforma de Telecomunicaciones. *Fecha de aprobación: abril de 2013*

El pasado 10 de junio se aprobó la Reforma en materia de telecomunicaciones, que consistió en modificar los artículos 6, 7, 27, 28, 73, 94 y 105 de la Constitución Política.⁸² Las telecomunicaciones componen uno de los sectores que han crecido de manera significativa en los pasados veinte años en México, la Reforma busca fortalecer los derechos vinculados con la libertad de expresión e información, establecer el derecho al acceso de tecnologías de la información y comunicación, así como a los servicios de radiodifusión y telecomunicaciones, incluida la banda ancha.⁸³

Las telecomunicaciones en México han sido un sector monopolizado, la Reforma busca fomentar la competencia tanto en la televisión abierta como en la restringida, en la radio y en la telefonía fija y móvil. Busca además que se generen las condiciones para lograr un incremento sustancial en la infraestructura de telecomunicaciones del país, así como hacer valer la obligación de eficientar su uso, lo cual redundaría directamente en la disminución de los precios y en el aumento de la calidad de los servicios dada la competencia.

Las telecomunicaciones serán servicios públicos de interés general, por lo que el Estado garantizará que sean prestados en condiciones de competencia, calidad, pluralidad, cobertura universal, interconexión, convergencia, acceso libre y continuidad.⁸⁴ Con la Reforma, se crearán órganos autónomos independientes que regularan el sector, contando con independencia presupuestal y de gestión.

Reforma Hacendaria. *Fecha de aprobación: octubre 2013*

⁸² Sánchez Santos, Mariana. ¿Revolución o extinción? Reflexiones sobre las reformas estructurales en México. Cuadrivio. Política y Sociedad. <http://cuadrivio.net/2013/08/revolucion-o-extincion-reflexiones-sobre-las-reformas-estructurales-en-mexico/>

⁸³ Fuente: Reforma en materia de telecomunicaciones. <http://pactopormexico.org/reforma-telecomunicaciones/>

⁸⁴ Fuente: NOTISEM. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. <http://www.sre.gob.mx>

Esta Reforma busca apoyar a las familias mexicanas y a los trabajadores por medio de ciertos beneficios, tales como:

- Otorgar pensión universal a los adultos mayores de 65 años
- Formalizar un seguro de desempleo para los trabajadores formales
- Disminuir las cuotas al IMSS (*Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social*) para los trabajadores con menores ingresos
- Estímulos para los empleadores que contraten mano de obra mayor de 65 años
- Apoyo a la economía familiar al suprimir el IVA (*Impuesto al Valor Agregado*) a los alimentos y medicinas
- Erradicación del IVA en la compra de viviendas, hipotecas, renta de inmuebles con la finalidad de ser utilizados como casa-habitación y en colegiaturas escolares, así como en espectáculos públicos y eventos deportivos.

Se derivan también ciertos apoyos para garantizar el crecimiento económico, por medio de:

1. Mantener las tasas empresariales efectivas más competitivas dentro del sistema de la OCDE
2. Invertir en capital humano, innovación e infraestructura
3. Crear el Régimen de Incorporación Fiscal para que las empresas pequeñas formales puedan ofrecer acceso al IMSS, Seguro de Desempleo y al crédito de vivienda
4. Crear un nuevo régimen de incorporación con un descuento del 100% en el ISR para las empresas
5. Fortalecer el comercio exterior mediante la simplificación de la regulación aduanera
6. Eliminar impuestos que obligan a la doble tributación
7. Implementar nuevas tecnologías en el SAT (Servicio de Administración Tributaria) para ahorrar tiempo y esfuerzo a los contribuyentes

8. Implementar un mecanismo ágil de certificación para la devolución del IVA para las maquiladoras para no afectar al sector exportador
9. Apoyar a los sectores prioritarios con potencial de crecimiento
10. Permitir deducciones de hasta el 53% en las prestaciones a los trabajadores.⁸⁵

La Reforma significa una mejora, busca implementar una composición en el sistema actual, renovándolo desde su estructura. Esta renovación del sistema impositivo mexicano pretende ser el impulso necesario para lograr un México más próspero y equitativo, por medio de las nuevas regulaciones. La Reforma está llamada a hacer una Reforma social que contribuya a un México con más progreso.

Reforma Financiera. *Fecha de aprobación: noviembre 2013*

Esta Reforma representa la oportunidad para que el sector financiero contribuya en mejor medida al crecimiento económico incluyente. La Reforma modifica 34 ordenamientos contenidos en 13 iniciativas basadas en 4 pilares:

1. Fomentar la competencia en el sector financiero
2. Fomentar el crédito a través de la banca de desarrollo
3. Ampliar el crédito a través de las instituciones financieras privadas
4. Dar mayor solidez al sector financiero en su conjunto.⁸⁶

El fortalecimiento de la CONDUSEF (Comisión Nacional para la Protección y Defensa de los Usuarios de Servicios Financieros), también se beneficia de esta Reforma, ya que una de sus iniciativas es mejorar los procesos de los usuarios al utilizar los servicios de las entidades financieras del país. La transparencia en las transacciones también se ve favorecida al implementar regulaciones más estrictas.

La implementación de estas regulaciones están llamadas a lograr un avance en el nivel de vida de los mexicanos, logrando créditos más baratos para estimular el sector económico del país, el fomento de la competencia y la generación de

⁸⁵ Fuente: Reforma Hacendaria. <http://www.reformahacendaria.gob.mx>

⁸⁶ Fuente: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público. <http://www.shcp.gob.mx>

incentivos adicionales, entre otras prácticas son las medidas para lograr la eficacia del sistema financiero.

Reforma Energética. *Fecha de aprobación: diciembre de 2013.*

Esta Reforma implica modernizar el sector energético, sin privatizar las empresas públicas dedicadas a los hidrocarburos y a la electricidad. Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) y la Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE) serán dotados de mayor autonomía y de un nuevo carácter como empresas productivas del Estado, 100% públicas y 100% mexicanas.⁸⁷

Los objetivos fundamentales de la Reforma Energética son:

- Mantener la propiedad de la nación sobre los hidrocarburos que se encuentran en el subsuelo
- Modernizar y fortalecer, sin privatizar, a PEMEX y a la CFE como empresas productivas del Estado 100% mexicanas
- Permitir que la nación ejerza de manera exclusiva la planeación y control del sistema eléctrico nacional, en beneficio de un sistema competitivo que permita reducir los precios de la luz
- Contar con un mayor abasto de energéticos a mejores precios
- Garantizar estándares nacionales de eficiencia, transparencia y rendición de cuentas
- Combatir de manera efectiva la corrupción en el sector energético
- Fortalecer el ahorro de largo plazo a través de la creación del Fondo Mexicano del Petróleo para la estabilización y desarrollo, en beneficio de las generaciones futuras
- Impulsar el desarrollo con responsabilidad social y protegiendo al medio ambiente
- Atraer inversión al sector energético mexicano para impulsar el desarrollo del país

⁸⁷ Fuente: Reforma Energética. <http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/reformaenergetica>

- Reducir los riesgos financieros, geológicos y ambientales en las actividades de exploración y extracción de petróleo y gas.⁸⁸

Con la modificación al art. 27 constitucional, se mantiene la propiedad de la nación sobre los hidrocarburos en el subsuelo y la prohibición expresa de otorgar concesiones para la exploración y extracción de hidrocarburos. Asimismo, se establece que esta propiedad de la nación sobre los hidrocarburos en el subsuelo, deberá consignarse en los contratos que se realicen con particulares para los casos que así lo ameriten.

Las Reformas en materia política y de transparencia se encuentran en desarrollo, en un periodo de 13 meses la legislación mexicana ha sufrido las modificaciones necesarias para convertirse en regulaciones más eficientes de cara a la modernidad que amerita el caso.

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⁸⁸ *Ibíd.*

***¿EU and CELAC: strategic partners or asymmetrical interaction
Towards a balanced bi-regional relation***

Bianca-Monica Mina⁸⁹

Bi-regional co-operation has become an important feature of the contemporary international system, its main benefits being defined in the terms of improving mutual understanding, promoting trade and investments, diversifying co-operation between regions. Building bridges between Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and the European Union (EU) is no exception.

Starting with the 90's, the Rio Group (Permanent Mechanism of Political Consultation and Agreement), as the representative and inclusive co-operation mechanism of the Latin American and Caribbean region at that time⁹⁰, saw the advantages of developing the dialogue with the EU. This process initially took the form of annual meetings at ministerial level, with relevant co-operation documents in various fields being adopted⁹¹. The first bi-regional high-level meeting was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1999, and a strategic partnership was established on that occasion.

The Rio Summit was followed by other five summits, in: Madrid (2002), Guadalajara (2004), Vienna (2006), Lima (2008) and again Madrid (2010).

The Rio Group was the predecessor of CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), which was launched in 2010 as the new regional mechanism for political dialogue and co-operation, the most complete Latin-American organization in terms of number of members, gathering all the 33 states

The views expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not represent the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania.

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⁹⁰ Created in 1986 by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (the members of the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group). Later on, other 16 states joined the organization.

⁹¹ Human Rights, poverty reduction, peace and security, drugs, renewables etc.

under its umbrella. Therefore, CELAC has become EU's counterpart for the bi-regional partnership process.

The first EU-CELAC Summit was held in Santiago de Chile, on 26-27 January 2013, the next one being scheduled to take place in Brussels, in 2015.

The political objectives of the European Union towards LAC, as mentioned in various statements of the European Commission⁹² are:

- to consolidate the political dialogue at regional and sub-regional level (Central America, Andean Community, MERCOSUR) and bilaterally;
- to promote regional integration through concluding association agreements with sub-regions;
- to promote social cohesion and tackle poverty and social exclusion through development aid.

Reflecting upon EU's interest in the LAC dynamics, HRVP Catherine Ashton emphasized the "need to find even more ambitious ways of working together".

Defining "ambitious" could be a challenge in the current circumstances, in which the traditional balance between the regions seems to have changed. The growing economic difficulties in the EU downgraded Latin America as a priority (Delisante & Bonilla, 2013, p.39), while LAC countries were less affected by the financial crisis, being preoccupied mainly to enhance the international profile of the region, and less to develop co-operation with the EU.

In his final remarks at the Santiago Summit, the President of Chile reaffirmed the commitment to create a new strategic alliance which will allow a "more symmetrical relationship" between the two regions at a moment when LAC does not stop growing and Europe is enduring one of the worst crises in its history (Delisante & Bonilla, 2013, p.6)

⁹² "Stronger Partnership between the European Union and Latin America (2005) and "EU-Latin America: global players in Partnership" (2009).

Although officials' rhetoric sounds very promising on both sides of the Atlantic, the future of the EU-CELAC bi-regional relation is still bearing many question marks.

The EU is still LAC's largest partner and a source for foreign investment, but it could soon lose its position to China by the middle of the current decade. According to a report prepared by ECLAC and AECID in 2012⁹³, economic growth in Latin America will continue to outpace growth in the European Union over the next few years. Economic prospect for 2012 to 2015 suggest that Latin America and the Caribbean may grow almost twice as fast as the European Union.

There have been voices pledging for an improvement of EU's engagement in the region, in terms of coherence and continuity of the foreign and development policies (Mendizabal & Edwards, 2008, p.2).

On the Latin American side, integration is still affected by nationalism and presidential pressure, despite the economic progress. Traditional integration systems with a certain degree of supra-nationalism co-exist with other experiments in cooperation (Roy, 2013, p.1). The fact that Latin American and Caribbean states did not manage to create a "community of states" as an interlocutor for the EU until 2013, was proof that they were lacking confidence in their capacity to integrate (Bărbulescu & Ghigiu, 2013, p. 29). In our opinion, it shows also a lack of political will to deepen integration, as CELAC continues to work as a permanent mechanism of regional consultation and not as a tool for integration.

As Joachin Roy put it, for the project to survive, it requires the existence of effective institutions, ruled by a juridical structure that is accepted by all.⁹⁴

⁹³ Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union: striving for a renewed partnership, report prepared under component 4 "Integration, Trade and Investments" of the 2010-2012 Technical Cooperation Programme between the Economic Commission for Latin America and The Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID).

⁹⁴ Joachin Roy, "European Union-Latin American Relations in a Turbulent Era", The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 12, Special December 2012, p.15.

The second CELAC Summit, held in Havana in January 2014, under Cuban presidency, brought high expectations in terms of advancing on the integration path. But analysts consider that CELAC's consolidation requires more substantial accomplishments (Serbin, 2014, p.2). CELAC still lacks legal status, organizational structure and institutional authority.

In these circumstances, it is important to find answers to questions such as:

- Is the EU-CELAC bi-regional co-operation working at its best parameters?
- Are the EU and the CELAC currently showing the same level of commitment towards implementing the partnership in a pragmatic and mutually beneficial manner?
- How to make the partnership more effective on a long-term perspective?

The EU-CELAC 2013 Summit had as main theme "Alliance for a sustainable development: Investment for economic growth, social inclusion and environmental sustainability" ("Alianza para un Desarrollo Sustentable: Promoviendo Inversiones de Calidad Societal y Ambiental").

The leaders adopted a political Declaration and an Action Plan for 2013-2015, which is an update of the Action Plan agreed upon in Madrid in 2010.

The political **Declaration** is a 48 articles document, which is structured on four main chapters:

1. New CELAC-EU Dialogue;
2. Shared values and positions in the international and multilateral arena;
3. Progress in the bi-regional Strategic Partnership process;
4. Alliance for Sustainable Development: Promoting Investments of Social and Environmental Quality (European Parliament, 2013, p. 1-14).

Critical voices close to the negotiations⁹⁵ said that due to the extent of the Declaration, reaching an agreement on the text took ages, thus participants ran out of time and didn't manage to discuss the Action Plan in detail, as they should have;

⁹⁵ who wanted to remain anonymous.

according to analysts who also criticize the lack of cohesion of the document, the Declaration was drafted following the diplomatic practice of “reiterating the reiterated” (Tremolada, 2013, 199).

The objective of the **EU-CELAC Action Plan 2013-2015** (the second important document of the Santiago Summit), based on the Madrid Action Plan, is to “identify instruments and activities which, if properly implemented should lead to concrete results guaranteeing ownership and capacity building in the following key areas:

- science, research, innovation and technology;
- sustainable development, environment, climate change, biodiversity, energy;
- regional integration and interconnectivity to promote social inclusion and cohesion;
- migration;
- education and employment to promote social inclusion and cohesion;
- the world drug problem;
- gender;
- investments and entrepreneurship for sustainable development (European Union External Action, 2013, p.1).

The Action Plan is a very ambitious document, which identifies many instruments and actions in the fields that were agreed upon. The wide range of topics reflects the variety of expectations. What it really lacks is deadlines and clear responsibilities, and this is why it is difficult to put it into practice and to have a follow up. The conclusion is that the level and quality of political discussion at the Summit remains insufficient for turning the Action Plan into a really effective tool, and should be doubled by concrete measures agreed at expert level in between the Summits, the EU Council’s Working Group on Latin America and the Caribbean (COLAC) and the EU-CELAC Senior Officials Meeting (SOM Reunions).

Another initiative of the Madrid Summit was the creation of European Union-Latin America and Caribbean Foundation (EU-LAC Foundation), which took up its

activities in November 2011. The EU-LAC Foundation has 62 members: the 33 states of Latin America and the Caribbean, the 28 members of the European Union, and the European Union institutions.

According to the official website of the Foundation, it aims at „transforming the strategic partnership between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, which was adopted in 1999, into a strengthened and visible reality in which the respective societies participate actively” (EU-LAC Foundation, 2013). It is also a new instrument to promote contacts at civil society level (Leffler, 2013, p. 6)

In fact, even if it became functional under German jurisdiction, the EU-LAC Foundation still lacks legal status as an international organization. Negotiations for the international agreement on the Foundation functioning are under way, but so far, the LAC partners do not seem so enthusiastic about the idea. There are concerns regarding representativity and participation in the decision making process. If the two sides manage to reach agreement by the 2015 Summit, it could be an important achievement of the bi-regional co-operation.

Analysts draw attention on LAC’s preference for the diplomacy of summits, or maliciously called ‘fever of summitry’, speaking about a ‘formidable resistance to the consolidation of independent institutions’ (Roy, 2013, p. 17). The diplomacy of summits has become a sort of public relations exercise, where leaders make enthusiastic public statements on regional integration ambitious objectives avoiding an evaluation of the tangible results. The dynamics of ‘summit diplomacy’, such as excessive rhetoric and failure to follow up on agreements that have been reached, damage the quality of the dialogue (Sanahuja, 2006, p. 5).

Similar problems have been identified also with regard to high-level meetings other than the EU-CELAC, such as the Ibero-American Summit. The 23rd one, held in Panama in October 2013, was attended only by half of the Head of States invited. It was an important signal that in order for this Summit to remain relevant, participants must redefine its objectives and functioning. Significant measures were endorsed, such as:

- holding the Summit biennially in order to alternate with the EU-CELAC summits;
- prioritizing and focusing on the major areas of common interest such as culture, social cohesion, economy and innovation;
- replacing the classic long Declaration by a more concise final document which will include concrete measures and will enable follow up;
- restructuring the activity of the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB);
- establishing an working group which will make suggestions to take the integration process further.
- last, but not least, establish regular contacts with the CELAC and develop relations with the EU.

Mutatis mutandis, some of these measures could be applied also to the EU-CELAC Summits, in order to make them more effective.

Speaking about effectiveness of the EU-CELAC political dialogue, analysts observe that this is limited by the broadness and lack of precision of the agenda, along with the lack of intermediary mechanisms and specialized dialogues to enable high-level meetings to be prepared in a more systematic way, in particular due to the weakness of the political harmonization processes in Latin America (Sanahuja, 2006, p. 6).

For instance, reducing the extent of the final political Declaration and prioritizing the topics on the agenda in order to have more time left for discussions of aspects that are really important, could be instrumental in making high-level meetings more effective.

Opinions regarding the well functioning of the EU-CELAC co-operation are shared. There are optimistic voices considering that the bi-regional relation in this new format, EU-CELAC, is still at the beginning, the CELAC itself being a young organization but a very heterogeneous one, which needs time to accommodate the various interests of its stakeholders, in order to be able to speak with the EU on one voice. The EU-CELAC Summits are seen as a good articulator of the dialogue

between both regions, and the European presence, through aid for development programmes, as a valuable asset (Delisante & Bonilla, 2013, p.5), which keeps the interest of LAC states alive. There are fields where co-operation is functioning swiftly, such as high-level education. It is also considered that old asymmetries between regions have been put aside, and the partnership is functioning on an equal basis (Leffler, 2013, p.1).

Critics are skeptical about the capacity of the decision makers from both regions to see reforming the partnership as a priority. This would mean making it more forward-looking and of mutual benefit. For instance, economic benefits within the regions are evaluated as insufficient, some countries receiving more than others (Grabendorff, 2012, p.31) The fact that more recently, due to internal difficulties to build consensus within different sub-regional LAC organizations, the tendency is to negotiate and sign separate agreements with the EU (such as the Multiparties Agreement with Peru and Colombia), could be considered symptomatic. Such is the case within MERCOSUR, where due to difficulties in reaching consensus, a similar approach could be favored by some states, such as Brazil and Uruguay. In any case, Venezuela is not taking part in the negotiations and after the accession of Bolivia and Ecuador, the two countries will probably follow the same path. Thus, the possibility of separate agreements concluded by the EU with those who are really interested and can advance a consistent offer, cannot not be excluded.

It became very clear that it is not easy work bi-regionally when it is hard to achieve consensus due to the lack of the necessary institutional mechanisms. Addressing asymmetries between the two regions is still a challenge and efforts in this respect should continue.

The preparatory process for the EU-CELAC Summit to be held in Bruxelles in 2015 has already started. The first phase is carried out for the EU by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and for the CELAC side by the Costa Rican rotating presidency, which will hand over to Ecuador in 2015. A first Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) is scheduled to take place in Brussels in June 2014, and on that

occasion the EEAS will suggest a theme for the summit, which will be negotiated with the counterpart. Giving the fact that the summit will take place in a period of changes such as institutional transition for the EU and changing presidency for the CELAC, it is likely that the topic chosen for the summit will be a generous one, focusing on aspects that will apparently not create difficulties in reaching consensus. Even if this will be the case, launching a debate on how to reform the partnership in order to make it more balanced and efficient is necessary and this should lead to both qualitative and quantitative revision. Otherwise, there is a risk for the Summit to become just another EU-CELAC high-level gathering, discussing more or less the same old agenda, but with no particular relevance for the future of the bi-regional relation.

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Globalization of Higher education: What does it mean for EU-LAC relations?

Raluca Georgiana Săftescu⁹⁶

This paper provides an overview of globalization theory, focusing particularly on the field of higher education. It first introduces the basic premises of globalization, identifying the assumption that borders get blurred or might even disappear, before examining in more details the specific characteristic of globalization of higher education. The subsequent section focuses on the role played by universities which has become the main focal point for globalization of higher education. Last but not least, the paper explores the EU-LAC relationship, stating that higher education provides an opportunity for strengthen the relations between the two regions.

Keywords: globalization, higher education, European Union, Latin America and Caribbean

Introduction

The essence of education will never disappear. The complexity of the 21st century reveals that education is interconnected with social development, economic growth, human rights and dignity. The investment in education is fundamental to reshape the norms and policies for regulating public life in social, political or economic dimensions. Linking the issue of globalization with the question of ensuring qualitative higher education systems express the conviction that globalization is a phenomenon that affects also the academic world.

The purpose of this paper is to offer a series of observations on academic globalization, focusing on the relations between the European Union and the Latin America and Caribbean. Assumptions about people's quality of life imply academic and knowledge exchanges among universities, research centers, scientific networks

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and cooperation between these and the business world. As we are all aware, the idea of investing in the field of higher education, research and innovation for promoting growth, employment and sustainable development is well rooted in the international agreements, the Santiago Declaration being one example. As we shall see, in our globalized world, the dissemination of knowledge constitutes a significant gain to intercultural learning. When we turn to consider the issue of higher education at a global level, we should begin with the ties existing between universities and the economic environment. This is manifested in the way that universities are driving forces behind economic, social and political developments. In this new context, the higher education systems have to be open to international cooperation and academic mobility.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that the EU relationship with Latin America transits fresh horizon after the First Academic Summit EU-LAC, hold in Santiago in 2013.

Understanding Globalization

The academic literature notes that `globalization can be many things with various manifestations, meanings, connections an interrelated complexities`⁹⁷.

Paul Hopper argues that globalization implies a greater extent of global interdependences than have previously existed, noticed in mutual interests and commitments, in the apparition of global networks, transnationalism, deterritorialization, space-time compression and the speeding of daily life.⁹⁸

Setting out on the road to understanding globalization as `global interconnectedness constituted by numerous flows an processes`⁹⁹, we must take into consideration all the factors which can shape the experiences and the global contacts: local conditions, historical, cultural and political influences. As for the effects of globalization, these are the results of interaction between global and local

⁹⁷ Wallace Brown Garret, *Globalization is what we make of it: contemporary globalization theory and the future construction of global interconnection*, Political Studies Review, Volume 6, Issue 1, January 2008, p.43

⁹⁸ Hopper Paul, *Living with globalization*, Berg Publishers, 2006, p.4

⁹⁹ Ibidem, p.10

levels, Hopper talking about a `myriad of global-local connections and interactions`.¹⁰⁰

Looking at the position taken by Garret W. Brown, the process of globalization appears to be dialectic, having two contradictory sides: one promotes more interdependence, resulting in prosperous economic markets, democracy and peace, while the other promotes the possibility to foster the economic inequality, the inter-ethnic conflict and to fail to ensure that human development is safe. The essential feature of this definition is that the conceptualization of globalization as a negative or positive thing depends on one's perception of it.¹⁰¹

Globalization of higher education

In a broad perspective, globalization can be conceived as a phenomenon that `tends to assume that borders and national systems as such get blurred or might even disappear`.¹⁰²

When we look at higher education systems the inherent changes produced by cross-border flows of ideas, mobility and financing couple with developments in information and communication technology. The logical and likely consequence is that higher education drives, and is driven by, globalization. The creation of a highly skilled workforce and the development of research and innovation capacity are the core of higher education missions.¹⁰³

The perception of knowledge as a key for development is accompanied by the crucial role played by higher education in facilitating the production and the distribution of knowledge. This approach shows that is compulsory to expand higher education. What is more important is that, being done that knowledge is universal, the universities, as institutions producing knowledge, have universal appeal. This is why, knowledge transcends national boundaries. In this perspective, universities adapt their educational programs to market demands and get global in

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem, p. 139

¹⁰¹ Wallace Brown Garret, op.cit., pp.44-45

¹⁰² Teichler Ulrich, *The Changing Debate on Internationalisation of Higher Education*, Higher Education, 48 (1), 2004, p.7

¹⁰³ ***, *Educational Research and Innovation Higher Education to 2030*, Volume 2, Globalisation, OECD Publishing, p.13

their operation. A first line of analyzing globalization of higher education is focused on cross-border higher education. The providers, programs, course materials, teachers or students are therefore seen as surpassing the traditional boundaries.¹⁰⁴ Within this frame of mind, the great importance of the international level is attested by the process of harmonization of European higher education systems by way of Bologna Process and the consequences of it in Latin America, Asia and Africa.

Following Stéphan Vincent-Lancrin¹⁰⁵, the apparition of worldwide university rankings and the media coverage which surrounds them is a signal for higher education field which is transforming the practices, the political decision-makers and the students of higher education institutions.

The relationship between globalization and markets shapes the universities in the sphere of teaching and in the sphere of research. Nowadays, the students want to study those programs that make them employable. Universities have to be prepared to offer courses for which there is a demand in the global market.

Analytically, globalization of higher education has some key effects for people and for countries¹⁰⁶:

1. the globalization of education has gathered momentum
2. the mobility of professionals has registered a phenomenal increase in the age of globalization
3. the reach and the spread of transnational corporations is worldwide

In the first case, another two dimensions have to be mention. Firstly, in the university world renown, the proportion of foreign students studying for professional degrees or doctorate is consistent. Secondly, there are some aspects involved which are important for developing countries: there, the institutions that

¹⁰⁴ Varghese N.V, *Globalization of higher education and cross-border student mobility*, International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris, 2008, pp.9-11

¹⁰⁵ Stéphan Vincent-Lancrin, 'Cross-border Higher Education: Trends and Perspectives', in *Educational Research and Innovation Higher Education to 2030*, Volume 2, Globalisation, OECD Publishing, p.66

¹⁰⁶ Deepak Nayyarm, 'Globalization: What does it Mean for Higher Education?' in Weber Luc E, Duderstadt James J. (eds), *The globalization of higher education*, Economica, Glion colloquium Series No 5, London, Paris and Geneva, pp.11-13

provide higher education are increasingly adopting curricula pursuant to international patterns and standards.

At the same time, the increased mobility of professionals, especially the brain drain, indicates that people with high skills or professional qualifications can emigrate permanently, live abroad temporarily, or stay at home and travel frequently for business.

Shortly, the people with higher education are almost as mobile as capital across borders and can be considered globalized people because they are employable almost anywhere.¹⁰⁷

Following, Luc Soete¹⁰⁸, the agenda of global research for development is important for both the developing as well as the `developed` world because this will be an incentive for new research activities, coordinated in this context by international partnerships and consortia. The ability to combine the existing knowledge is developed during the academic studies and it constitutes the basis of innovation nowadays. Because of the complex global environments, innovations do not suggest to copy the developed countries, but to tape knowledge from global sources and use them to solve problems in local situations. This situation underlines two interdependent directions of globalization in higher education: the collaboration and the competition. The emergence of new poles of science will strengthen the academic research and the globalization of higher education because the available international funds will demand more international cooperation, mobility and worldwide competition.

Summing up, the universities have to adapt in these complex times because globalization gives a new emphasis to opportunities, but they challenge in that there is questioning the ideal of the public domain and common good. The traditional academic values like autonomy, academic freedom, research, students' work, assessment are kept, but they should be analyzed within the perspective of

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem, p.12

¹⁰⁸ Luc Soete in Han Aarts and Heinz Greijn, `Globalization, knowledge and learning: Developing the capacities of higher education institutes` , in Teferra Damtew and Greijn Heinz, *Higher Education and Globalization: Challenges, Threats and Opportunities for Africa*, Maastricht University Centre for International Cooperation in Academic Development (MUNDO), Netherlands 2010, p.10

global education. The international relations and academic exchanges with foreign countries are essential for the role of contemporary university, deeply rooted in the international dimension of its work. As some authors point out, the result of globalization of higher education is the borderless nature of contemporary knowledge.¹⁰⁹

Perspectives on Globalization of Higher Education and the EU-LAC relationship

Higher education is considered to be a major driver of progress because is the basis of economic growth and competitiveness. Taking into consideration the global challenges nowadays (climate changes, human security, sustainable development, health, food security, financial crises, movement of people¹¹⁰), higher education is a key to tackle these types of challenges. At the heart of the wealth of nations and the well-being of humankind thesis lies a particular conception of knowledge. In the 21st century, it is obvious that knowledge remains a very powerful concept in the process of economic growth and social progress.

At the EU-LAC level, higher education provides an opportunity for strengthen the relations between two regions and it is a matter of priority to raise cooperation between countries of the European Union and the Latin and American countries.

The promotion of a `EU-LAC Knowledge Area` dates back to 2004¹¹¹, when the universities of Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean undertook to establish a set of common objectives and targets for creating `an integrated area, which may encourage the compatibility and comparability of the higher education systems and

¹⁰⁹ Francisco López Segrera, `Trends of higher education worldwide and in Latin America and Caribbean`, in Francisco López Segrera, Colin Brock, José Dias Sobrinho, *Higher education in Latin America and the Caribbean 2008*, UNESCO-IESALC, Caracas, 2009, p. 13

¹¹⁰ Cooper Andrew F., Heine Jorge, Thakur Ramesh, *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, OUP, 2013, pp.12-13

¹¹¹ Declaration of Guadalajara,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/cumbres_ue_alc/guadalajara_2004_en.pdf,
accessed February 24, 2014

thereby achieve greater mobility of students, teachers and administrators that will generate a broader common culture and stronger ties between the new generations¹¹².

The history of EU-LAC relationship offers an interesting perspective of what a strategic partnership mean for higher education globalization. The Strategic Partnership between the EU and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1999¹¹³ was constructed on a shared conviction that both regions benefit from working together and have common interests in the present world characterized by interdependence.

Taking into consideration that universities were the forerunners to globalization¹¹⁴, in this context of a strategic partnership, they build interconnections and linkages with their exchange programs and their gatherings (conferences, symposia, workshops, etc.). These support the free exchange of knowledge and ideas, higher education being an area of bi-regional interest for EU and LAC.

As we can see before, globalization expands and transforms the role of universities, which become actors in the international system, the same as they are today companies, NGOs, regions and local governments. For integrating the phenomenon of globalization of higher education, the strategic partnership between EU-LAC gives an example in this regard by developing projects with the purpose of increasing innovation, research and academic mobility. All of this aim to improve the competitiveness and to create jobs in an interconnected world.

Over time, the EU has created a series of projects in the field of higher education that have underlined the universal appeal of the universities and have

¹¹² Declaration of Guadalajara of the universities of Europe, Latin America and the Carribbean, http://www.eua.be/typo3conf/ext/bzb_securelink/pushFile.php?cuid=2122&file=fileadmin/user_upload/files/EUA1_documents/Guadalajara_declaration.pdf, accessed February 24, 2014

¹¹³ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament follow-up to the first summit between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union, COM/2000/0670 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0670:FIN:EN:PDF>, accessed February 25, 2014

¹¹⁴ Wayne C. Johnson, 'Partnering on a Global Scale', in Weber Luc E, Duderstadt James J. (eds), op.cit., p.29

showed that knowledge could transcend national boundaries. Here, we can mention the Alban program, launched with the purpose of providing postgraduate scholarships to enable students and professionals in Latin America to study in the European Union, ALFA program aimed to promote cooperation between higher education establishments in both regions and Erasmus Mundus program that had like objectives to improve the education and to train human resources, as well as to promote partnerships and institutional co-operation exchanges between Higher Education institutions¹¹⁵. For 2014-2020, the EU has substantially increase their budgets for programs in science, technology and academic mobility through Erasmus Plus and the Horizon 2020 initiatives.

For the EU-LAC relationship, these new programs emerge as a central issue on the both region agenda partly because higher education may lead to strengthen the partnership existing between them. The opportunity for Latin American students to study in Europe is a mark of the mobility of professionals that has registered a phenomenal increase in the age of globalization.

These developments are especially important because, in the present globalized world, the role of universities is increasing, since these are the ones that create goodwill, that contribute to the professional growth of young people who have become part of the globalized labor market.¹¹⁶

Also, in today world, both the EU and CELAC are going through a period in which the financial, economic, political and social crises intermingle. It is therefore more vital than ever for the countries of both regions to come together for maintaining an important influence on the international stage. To achieve this objective, the universities can contribute by producing and disseminating universal knowledge. Due to the dual characteristics of the universities – national and international- the knowledge promoted is also national and international¹¹⁷ and

¹¹⁵ Country Briefing Regional Co-operation Program, Program Review 2013, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/regional-cooperation/documents/regional_cooperation_programmes_-_general_review_2013.pdf, accessed February 26, 2014

¹¹⁶ Bărbulescu Iordan Gheorghe, El papel de las universidades en el desarrollo de las relaciones UE-CELAC, Revista Europea de Estudios Latino Americanos, Vol. 1, No. 2, Bucharest, 2013, p.19

¹¹⁷ Varghese N.V.,op.cit., p.10

ensures that humankind is the beneficiary of the great cross border education. So, the Action Plan EU-CELAC 2013-2015¹¹⁸ is seen as one of the principal axes of the `Joint Initiative for innovation and research` which involves close cooperation between universities and centers of both regions. Alfredo Moreno, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, has underlined these aspects during the First Academic Summit EU-CELAC¹¹⁹:

„ We are convinced that a closer and more effective cooperation between universities and research centers on both sides of the Atlantic can help to make a qualitative leap in the modernization of education systems, providing synergies with vision and future prospects, as well as the development of our human capital, in order to create more qualified companies to address the complex challenges of the XXI century, more prosperous, more just and democratic.”

Conclusion

The argument sketched in this short paper is that globalization process has an enormous effect of higher education. In this context, it was shown that globalization was changing the ways in which knowledge is produced, applied and disseminated. Universities as the most important institutions in the organization of research and higher education are crucial for better management of today world challenges. So, they need to adapt their roles and develop their abilities to anticipate and respond to these issues.

Taking into consideration that both EU and LAC are facing the same problems, today, more than ever, it is necessary to deepen the EU-LAC relationship, strengthen the academic cooperation and ensure better quality of workers. The programs in the field of higher education developed between two regions are important in order to promote the regional collaboration. At the same time, both EU

¹¹⁸ EU-CELAC Action Plan 2013-2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/la/summits/docs/2013_santiago_summit_eu-celac_action_plan_en.pdf, accessed February 27, 2014

¹¹⁹ Speech of Alfredo Moreno, <http://www.cumbreacademica-alcue.cl/noticia9.html>, accessed February 28, 2014

and LAC needs to enhance their international role. The driving force for this should be the higher education systems and the principles established in the framework of the Strategic Partnership.

Special emphasis was placed on the Erasmus Plus and the Horizon 2020 initiatives, as on the EU-LAC Action Plan 2013-2015, in order to enhance the relations between EU and LAC in the academic field.

Finally, the universities are important elements in the EU-LAC relationship for stimulating cooperation and deal with common issues.

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Las relaciones de cooperación al desarrollo entre Nicaragua y la Unión Europea

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Como uno de los líderes en la diplomacia mundial, la Unión Europea trata de lograr un alcance global en la economía, la política y la seguridad. Y el espacio Latino-Americano representa una parte necesaria de cualquier estrategia destinada a desarrollar marcos políticos para todas las regiones del mundo. Dado que existen fuertes vínculos históricos y culturales entre la Unión y América Latina, no resulta para nada sorprendente que se ha establecido una relación integral entre las dos entidades, basada en el diálogo político, la cooperación y un régimen comercial favorable. Las prioridades políticas¹²¹ de la UE hacia América Latina y el Caribe se centran entre otros en:

- Profundizar el diálogo político a nivel bilateral, regional y multilateral;
- Promover el comercio en beneficio mutuo, así como los lazos de inversión;
- Impulsar las relaciones bilaterales con los distintos países de América Latina al tiempo que se apoya la integración regional;
- Intensificar la cooperación en campos como: diálogo sobre cuestiones macroeconómicas y financieras, medio ambiente y energía, o de ciencia y investigación;
- Apoyar los esfuerzos de la región para reducir la pobreza y la desigualdad, así como para lograr el desarrollo sostenible, en consonancia con la Agenda para el Cambio de la UE;
- Adaptar los programas de cooperación para cubrir áreas innovadoras no contempladas en la cooperación al desarrollo tradicional;

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¹²¹ La Unión Europea y América Latina: Una asociación de actores globales
http://eeas.europa.eu/la/docs/com09_495_es.pdf

- la participación de la sociedad civil en la Asociación Estratégica, entre otros, mediante la Fundación EU-LAC.

En 2012, la UE y América Central firmaron un Acuerdo de Asociación¹²², que fue aplicado poco después en Nicaragua, Honduras, Panamá, Costa Rica y El Salvador. De hecho, La Unión Europea es el principal donante del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA) – cuyo miembro¹²³ es Nicaragua - y sus instituciones, desembolsando entre 2007 y 2013 más de 214 millones EUR de ayuda bilateral¹²⁴ en favor de Nicaragua.

Las relaciones políticas y económicas de la Unión Europea (UE) con Nicaragua han evolucionado de forma notable desde sus inicios a mediados de los años ochenta, llevando como meta común la consolidación de un modelo de desarrollo sostenible basado en “la paz, la democracia, la consolidación del Estado de Derecho y la profundización de la integración regional, tanto a nivel económico como político.”¹²⁵ En una primera etapa, la UE jugó un papel determinante en el fortalecimiento de los procesos de paz en Centroamérica, promoviendo a escala internacional los espacios inclusivos necesarios para llegar a una pronta solución de los conflictos en la región. Esta dinámica, enmarcada en lo que se ha conocido como "Diálogo de San José", ha servido de pauta para una destacada dimensión política en las relaciones entre el istmo y Europa, que se mantiene hasta hoy día. Al pasar de los años, el Diálogo se ha enriquecido, adaptándose a la nueva realidad que vive la región centroamericana.

El Acuerdo Marco para la Cooperación¹²⁶, firmado en febrero de 1993 entre Europa y América Central, amplió los temas, abarcando la cooperación económica y la tradicional cooperación al desarrollo, incluyendo además programas de cooperación científica y tecnológica, de protección al medio ambiente, de lucha contra la droga, y de respecto a los derechos humanos.

¹²² http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150037.pdf

¹²³ <http://www.sica.int/miembros/ni/gobierno.aspx>

¹²⁴ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-838_es.htm

¹²⁵ http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nicaragua/eu_nicaragua/political_relations/index_es.htm

¹²⁶ http://eeas.europa.eu/ca/pol/pdca_12_03_es.pdf

La evolución de los regímenes políticos en Nicaragua

El país más grande de Centroamérica y uno de los menos poblados, con cerca de 500 kilómetros de costa, Nicaragua se esfuerza por superar las secuelas de la dictadura, la guerra civil y los desastres naturales, que han hecho que sea uno de los países más pobres del hemisferio occidental.

Catalogado como el “segundo país más pobre del continente americano,”¹²⁷ conforme a la información brindada por organismos internacionales y a la opinión que prevalece a nivel internacional. Aproximadamente el 45% de la población del país vive con dos dólares o menos al día, siendo considerada pobre, y el 16% es considerado viviendo en pobreza extrema, según un informe¹²⁸ del Banco Mundial.

El desarrollo económico está ligado intrínsecamente a los niveles de la productividad de un país y el modelo mantenido en Nicaragua refleja una exportación de materias primas con poca o ninguna manufactura, sin generar valor agregado a los productos finales. Esto se refleja en los ramos que más representan en cuanto a Producto Interno Bruto: carne, café y azúcar. Si bien una buena economía garantiza estabilidad y prosperidad económica, no garantiza también la distribución de la riqueza que se genera.

Tradicionalmente, el país se ha basado en las exportaciones agrícolas para sostener su economía, pero de éstas se beneficiaron principalmente unas pocas familias de la élite de ascendencia española, principalmente de la familia Somoza, que gobernó el país con apoyo de los Estados Unidos entre 1937 y la revolución sandinista en 1979.

¹²⁷ El Banco Mundial, Reporte de Monitoreo Global 2011: Mejorando las posibilidades de alcanzar los ODM. Washington, 2011

¹²⁸ El Banco Mundial, Producto Interno Bruto 2009 . Washington, 2010. Disponible para consulta en: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/POP.pdf>

El gobierno corrupto de la dinastía Somoza le dio fuerza a los grupos guerrilleros de izquierda de Nicaragua, encabezados por el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). Los sandinistas comenzaron redistribuir la propiedad y realizaron grandes progresos en las esferas de la salud y la educación. Ellos ganaron una victoria decisiva en las elecciones de 1984, pero su orientación izquierdista también atrajo la hostilidad de los Estados Unidos, hecho que favoreció un acercamiento hacia la Unión Soviética y Cuba.

Para la guerrilla fue fácil reclutar nicaragüenses, tanto pobres como de clase media, y eventualmente, logró que el hijo de Somoza, entonces presidente, se retirara del cargo en 1979. En los años 1980s, fuerzas anti-Sandinistas empezaron a formarse, muchas de ellas, secretamente financiadas por los Estados Unidos. La guerra entre estos grupos “Contra” y los Sandinistas se dio durante toda la década, antes de que las dos partes llegaran a una negociación y acordaran el establecimiento de elecciones a principios de los 1990s. Los grupos Contra estuvieron activos en las dos regiones que hoy en día son las más afectadas por el comercio de droga: la Región Autónoma del Atlántico Norte y la Región Autónoma del Atlántico Sur.

Sin embargo, durante gran parte de la historia, la lucha en Nicaragua no ha sido siempre en contra de los grupos de crimen organizado, sino entre las élites dueñas de tierra y los grupos guerrilleros. Para “complicar los asuntos de seguridad, en una larga historia de intervención de los Estados Unidos, la Marina de Estados Unidos ocupó el territorio por 21 años, aproximadamente, antes de retirarse en 1931¹²⁹. El apoyo de Estados Unidos a dictadores como Anastasio Somoza García (1937-1947), también ayudó a fortalecer la arraigada sospecha de la influencia de Estados Unidos sobre la soberanía de Nicaragua. Aun se podría afirmar que la tensa relación continúa hasta hoy en día, dado que cambios significativos en materia de gobernanza no se han registrado en los últimos años.

¹²⁹ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/country_profiles/1225218.stm

En el caso de Nicaragua, “tanto la evolución de los regímenes políticos, como el desarrollo de procesos democratizadores constituyen fenómenos que se encuentran ligados (...) desde las primeras décadas del siglo xx a la dependencia de potencias foráneas como los Estados Unidos.”¹³⁰ A lo largo del tiempo, esto ha conllevado a la consolidación de una economía agroexportadora y la precaria construcción de un aparato político-administrativo, factores que han contribuido al deterioro gradual del país.

Hoy en día, Nicaragua es un tal-llamado “estado débil”, que se enfrenta a números obstáculos en su camino hacia la democratización y en reducir las desigualdades presentes en el ámbito político, socio-económico o étnico. Aunque logró la expansión amplia de la capacidad estatal y redujo las formas más agudas de desigualdad, el proceso revolucionario iniciado en 1979 no pudo “profundizar de forma sostenida el proceso democratizador.”¹³¹

Aún más, la pobreza extendida y la relativa simplicidad de la estructura social nicaragüense – que cuenta con una clase media poco desarrollada – facilitan “que el oficialismo amplíe su labor de cooptación y bloquee la emergencia de otras alternativas.”¹³² A estos factores se añade la tardía construcción de una estatalidad moderna, que fue implementada dentro de un marco autoritario y que impidió el desarrollo apropiado de una sociedad civil emergente que “reivindicase la autonomía como valor esencial de su identidad y accionar.”¹³³

Desde el inicio de su mandato, en 2007, el presidente Daniel Ortega puso las bases de un sistema de participación ciudadana que contribuyera al buen desempeño de su gobierno por todo el territorio nacional y que luego tomó el nombre de “Poder Ciudadano.” De esta forma, los Gabinetes del Poder Ciudadano tienen el deber de involucrarse en el desarrollo de la nación de manera activa y apoyar los planes y políticas del Presidente. Concretamente, su agenda de trabajo

¹³⁰ http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3887_1.pdf

¹³¹ http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3887_1.pdf

¹³² Chaguaceda, Armando, *Régimen político y estado de la democracia en Nicaragua. Procesos en desarrollo y conflictos recientes*, Nueva Sociedad no. 240, julio-agosto de 2012, p.3

¹³³ *Ibidem* 13

consiste en “repartición de becas estudiantiles y de formación profesional, (...) la creación de cooperativas y selección de los beneficiarios de programas sociales.”¹³⁴

En realidad, este modelo fracasa en promover una verdadera participación ciudadana, dado que se somete a los directrices del Frente Sandinista y responde a los planes de trabajo de los gobiernos municipales, bajo el control del aparato estatal.

Al momento actual, las afinidades ideológicas y afectivas que aún se mantienen con la herencia revolucionaria, el recuerdo de los costos de la guerra y el miedo a la violencia, paralizan todavía el pleno funcionamiento de una acción colectiva eficaz. Como causa directa, se puede hablar de un bajo nivel de gobernabilidad nacional, lo que podría conllevar en un futuro próximo a un aumento del autoritarismo.

Las relaciones Nicaragua – Unión Europea

Las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y Nicaragua se iniciaron a finales de los años ‘70s y se fortalecieron a nivel centroamericano con la institucionalización del Diálogo de San José (1984). Se reforzaron con la suscripción del Acuerdo de Diálogo Político y de Cooperación entre la UE y Centroamérica en 2003. Las relaciones entre ambas partes se desarrollan también a través del diálogo birregional entre la UE y el istmo centroamericano (CC SICA). En 1996, la UE estableció en Nicaragua la Delegación Europea para Centroamérica y Panamá. Hoy en día, Nicaragua y la Unión Europea mantienen relaciones de amplio espectro basadas en vínculos históricos y culturales, valores y principios comunes que les convierten en aliados naturales. Estos valores giran “alrededor de la defensa de los derechos humanos, la democracia, el multilateralismo, la justicia y la cohesión social.”¹³⁵ El diálogo político entre Nicaragua y la UE se mantiene también a través de las diferentes cumbres entre la UE y América Latina y el Caribe.

¹³⁴ <http://encuentro.uca.edu.ni/images/stories/2012/pdf/84e/84e5a.pdf>

¹³⁵ <http://embanicbelgica.cancilleria.gob.ni/index.php/es/bilaterales/nicaragua-republica-checa-y-union-europea/nicaragua-union-europea>

El Documento de Estrategia País (DEP)- para Nicaragua 2007-2013, con un monto de 214 millones de Euros, tiene por objetivo principal “asegurar el desarrollo sostenible del país, garantizando no solo un apoyo financiero a Nicaragua, sino también un incremento del diálogo político y de transferencia de buenas prácticas europeas que puedan garantizar y fortalecer este desarrollo sostenible.”¹³⁶ La cohesión social y la integración regional son parte importante de esta estrategia.

Las tres áreas prioritarias de intervención en la estrategia son:

- Mejora de la democracia y de la buena gobernabilidad
- Educación
- Asuntos económicos y comerciales
- Desarrollo socio-económico en el ámbito rural

De hecho, a pesar de la crisis financiera europea, el embajador de la Delegación de la Unión Europea para Centroamérica expresó en enero de 2014 el interés de la UE de mantener la ayuda a cinco países de América Latina destacando a Nicaragua. Nicaragua será beneficiada con “104 millones de euros para la ejecución de cinco proyectos en las áreas de educación, gestión fiscal, agua y saneamiento, desarrollo sostenible y seguridad en la Costa Caribe,”¹³⁷ con un período de ejecución de los recursos comprendido entre 2014 al 2020. Además, la directora para América Latina y el Caribe de EuropeAid, Jolita Butkeviciene, afirmó que estaba “muy contenta con los resultados de la cooperación” al país y dijo que se cerraron con éxito 13 proyectos bilaterales por un monto alrededor de 195 millones de euros invertidos desde el 2007 al 2013.”¹³⁸

¹³⁶http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nicaragua/eu_nicaragua/tech_financial_cooperation/bilateral_cooperation/index_es.htm

¹³⁷ <http://www.lajornadanet.com/diario/archivo/2014/enero/24/1.php>

¹³⁸ Ibidem 18

Esta noticia vino poco después de que a finales del año 2013, el comisario de Desarrollo Andris Piebalgs confirmó¹³⁹ un monto de 204 millones de euros para la nueva estrategia de cooperación de la UE con Nicaragua para el período 2014-2020. La estrategia estará enfocada en las siguientes prioridades: apoyo al sector productivo, en particular agropecuario; educación efectiva para el empleo y adaptación al cambio climático.

Entre los proyectos que la Unión Europea ejecutará este año en Nicaragua se incluye uno de Apoyo a la Educación Técnica y la Formación Profesional, que “apoyará la estrategia del Gobierno en este tema para que la población económicamente activa que forma o va a formar parte de la fuerza laboral, sobre todo los jóvenes, eleven sus niveles de formación, diversifiquen sus habilidades y logren las cualificaciones profesionales necesarias que les permitan insertarse en el mercado laboral, mejorar su productividad y sus ingresos”¹⁴⁰, según afirmó la directora para América Latina y el Caribe de EuropeAid, Jolita Butkeviciene.

También se impulsarán el programa de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Fiscal y proyectos dedicados a apoyar el desarrollo económico de la Costa Caribe, la colaboración con la Policía Nacional, el Ministerio Público y otras instituciones implicadas en la prevención y control del crimen organizado y tráfico de drogas. Como medidas futuras, se respaldarán el desarrollo económico local sostenible en la Costa Caribe a través del turismo y se implementará un Programa Integral Sectorial de Agua y Saneamiento Humano que “contribuirá a mejorar y ampliar los sistemas de abastecimiento de agua potable y saneamiento para 420 mil personas en 19 ciudades”¹⁴¹.

Pese al fuerte crecimiento reciente, la desigualdad sigue siendo uno de los retos más acuciantes en América Latina. EUROsociAL se ha convertido “en el programa

¹³⁹ <http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/economia/308713-educacion-nicaragua-clave-ue>

¹⁴⁰ <http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/economia/308713-educacion-nicaragua-clave-ue>

¹⁴¹ Ibidem 21

insignia de la Unión Europea en América Latina para la cohesión social.”¹⁴² Bajo el lema «Apoyar las políticas, conectar las instituciones», reúne a los responsables políticos y a los funcionarios de alto nivel de las administraciones públicas de Europa y de América Latina para elaborar y aplicar políticas que reduzcan las desigualdades sociales. La contribución total de la UE asciende a 70 millones EUR: 30 millones EUR en la primera fase (2004-2009) y 40 millones EUR en la segunda (2011-2014).

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¹⁴²http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nicaragua/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20140325_01_es.htm

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